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Introduction 
Economic Development and Family Income Distribution 
The inequality of Family Income Distribution (FID) has long been recog­
nized as an important social problem in both the rich and the poor countries. 
Any respectable theory of FID must give prominent recognition to the fact 
that the total income pattern (Y
1 , Y2 , ... , Y)n of n-families has many addi­
tive components Wi = (Wi
l' 
wi
2' . . . , Wni) (i· = l ' 2 ' ... ' r) . l For example, 
the traditional theory of functional income distribution focuses on the dis­
tinction between wage and property income. In case the labor force provided by 
families is heterogeneous, the wage income components are again the additive 
sum of homogeneous subcomponents, characterized by differences in age, sex 
and educational level. Thus, if an index of income inequality such as the 
Gini Coefficient, G, is adopted, the same index can also be used to describe they 
equity of any factor component, G(Wi). The basic purpose of FID analysis must be 
to 11 explain11 the total Gini, G, which is obviously affected by the componenty 
factor Ginis G(Wi). 
Any positive theory of FID must thus examine the forces determining 
the pattern of the income components, Wi. The two main components of total 
income customarily are wage and property income which are, in turn, trace-
able mainly to the family ownership of human and physical capital assets, respec­
tively.2 The heart of economic development is a concern with the accumulation of 
these human and physical assets over time; hence, any useful investigation of 
changes in FID must be inextricably linked up with the theory of development. 
Two facets of this link are essential: the functional distribution of 
income and the equity of the distribution of family assets (or incomes).The 
l.
l .e., Y = Wl + w2 + ... + wr. 
2
Add"itional. decomposition, by age, sex and education level, would clearly
be desirable and is contemplated but not attempted in this paper. 
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traditional functional income distribution theory which can be linked 
directly to growth theory tends to determine factor prices and factor 
shares(¢.). The equity of the existing family factor incomes, G(Wi), is 
l 
affected by the differentiated patterns of family acquisition of human and 
physical assets in the past. 
In this paper we attempt to design an abstract quantitative framework 
for FID analysis and then to apply it empirically to Taiwan, a specific case of 
contemporary development. The quantitative framework we have developed aims, 
in the first instance, at deriving a decomposition equation linking G, the y 
overall Gini, to the G( Wi) , the component factor Ginis, and ¢. , the component
l 
factor shares. A full development of this decomposition technique will be 
presented in the Appendix. In the text we shall only present the major 
results with the aid of~ concrete example. 
Our major purpose is the application of this quantitative analytical 
framework to an investigation of the impact on FID of growth in a labor 
airpl.us developing economy. Guided by the growth theoretic notions relevant 
to such an economy, we identify the existence of dualism between rural 
and urban activities as a pronounced feature of the landscape. The above 
framework can therefore be applied to the economy as a whole and separately 
to the rural and urban sectors. In the urban sector wage and pr·operty 
income are the main factor income components; in the rural sector the main 
components are agricultural income as well as the wage and property income 
arising in rural industries. Our empirical work will focus on the case of 
Taiwan. 
The relationship between growth and the distribution of income in the 
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course of development is gaining increasing attention in recent years. Some claim 
there exists a necessary inverse U-shaped relationship between equity and growth 
- lso that "things have to get substantially worse before they can get better." 
While such conclusions are based on inductive evidence, 2 there remains the 
question of the logical necessity of the asserted trade-off between growth 
and distribution. By linking the inquiry of income distribution and growth 
we hope to advance our theoretical understanding of this important issue. 
l e.g., Adelman, I., Economic Growth & Social Equity in Developing Countries(Stanforci: Stanford-University Press, 1973); Kuznets, S., "Economic Growth
and Income Inequality," American Economic Review, March 1955, 45(1), pp. 1-28. 
2The empirical evidence has been mainly of a cross-country type, which,
in our view, lends itself less well to the task at hand than longitudinal
studies. 
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Section I: Total Income and Factor Component Patterns 
Let the pattern of the income of n-families be denoted by the row vector 
lY = (Y1 , Y2 , •.. , Yn). At any point.in time Y may be the additive sum of 
r-factor income components: 
l 2 rl.l) a) y )... , = w + w + .•. + w n 
b) ... , i = 1, 2, ... , r 
To illustrate the ideas involved, let us assume that there are three factor 
components, i.e., physical capital (i=l), skilled labor (i=2), and unskilled 
labor ( i=3). 
At any point in time the difference between a wealthy and a poor 
family is due basically to their possession of different amounts of these 
assets. Suppose there are four families (n=4); the family ownership patterns 
of assets are indicated by the points on the horizontal axis of Diagrams labc 
(pointing to the left). When these family ownership patterns ar'e given "by 
·history," we know the total primary factor endowment patterns (i.e., total 
capital stock and total skilled and unskilled labor force) for the whole 
economy. Given the factor endowment, the factor prices, (i.e., the rate of 
return to capital as well as the skilled and unskilled wage nates) are 
determined by the theory of the functional distribution of income. 1 
1
such a theory is usually an aggregative theory relating the level of 
factor prices to some combination of the neo-classical marginal produc-
tivity theory as adjusted by considerations of market imperfections, e.g.,
it may seek to differentiate between the factor returns of a particular
homogeneous asset depending on whether it is owned by a "rich" or a "poor"
family. For purposes of this paper we intend to accept, rather than improve 
upon, whatever theory of the functional distribution of income seems appropriate. 
DIAGRAM l 
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In Diagram labc, suppose the slopes of the straight radial lines On, 0£, 
and Ou represent the factor prices~ w
1 ,w2,w3 . Then the indicated assets ownership 
patterns are transformed linear.:g-through these radial lines to the factor 
income patterns, Wi (l.lb) on the vertical axis. The total family income pattern, 
Y, (l.la) shown on the horizontal axis of Diagram ldef, is thus determined at the 
closed end of the model. We can also determine per family income Y, per family 
factor income W-i and the distributive shares of national income¢ .. For the
n-factor case, we have: 
l 
l. 2) a) y = (Yl + y2 + ... + yn )/n 
-ib) w = (Wi + wi + ... + Wi)/n i = 1, 2, ... ,l 2 n r 
c) ¢. = wi;rl i = 1, 2, ... , r 
d) ¢1 + ¢2 + ... + ¢r = l 
Since the asset ownership patterns are the result of cumulative 
family investments in physical and/or human capital in the past, we may 
expect the higher income families to own more capital assets as well as 
more of the highly educated labor force (doctors, lawyers, engineers, etc.). 
On the other hand, the low income families own, and derive income from, 
more of the society's unskilled labor force. Thus when the linear re­
gressions of factor income on total income of (1. 3a) 
' ... , 
-6-
Ai
1.3) a) W = b. + a. Y (i; 1, 2, 3, ... , r)
l l 
c) = 1 
are fitted to the data in (1.1),in the general case, we expect the regression 
coefficienis, a., to be positive for such components as property and skilledl 
wage income and to be negative for such components as unskilled wage income 
and transfer (i.e., welfare) income. In the example of Diagram ldef, 
regression lines with these different characteristics are shown for these 
three types of incomes. 1 
Since the total income pattern Y is the sum of all its factor components 
(1.1), the linear regression equations of (1.3) are not independent of each 
other. Thus the sum of the regression coefficients, a., must equal one and 
l 
that of the regression constants, b., add up to zero, as stated in (1.3bc)?
l 
Furthermore, in a growing economy, all family factor incomes, W~ (and hence 
total family incomes, Y.), are non-negative (i.e., the scatter diagrams inl 
ldef consist only of points lying in the first quadrant). 3 Thus 
1.4) a. < O implies b. > 0
l l 
1It should be emphasized that these regression relationships are deter-
mined at the closed end of the model, i.e., they are used for purely descriptive 
purposes and are devoid of the behavioristic connotations usually associated 
with regression lines (e.g., the consumption function) in economics. 
2This follows readily from the fact that a. and b. are estimated by the 
method of least squares. l l 
3
In other words, we assume there is no dissaving. 
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i.e. , for any regression line in the system, the regression constant, b. 
l 
and the regression coefficient, a., cannot both be negative. It follows 
l 
that the 2r parameters, a. and b. in system (1.3) can be classified into 
l l 
three types of cases: 
Type One: 
Type Two: 
Type Three: = (a 1 ,a +2 , .•• ,a; br +l' b 2 , ..• ,b ); a. < O, b. > 0r + r r r + r i i2 2 2 2 
These cases have a natural economic interpretation. With reference 
to our examples of Diagram ldef, suppose (a = •.2; a = + .5; a = + .7).1 2 3 
Thus whenever the income of two families differs by one dollar, the wealthier 
family has 50 (70) cents more skilled wage income (property income), and 
20 cents less unskilled wage income than the poorer family. Thus the a.' s 
l 
indicate the income sensitivity of the ith factor. The distinguishing 
characteristic of a Type Three case is that the income sensitivity is 
negative. Government transfer payments calculated to promote income distribu­
tion equity are typical of the Type Three case. Type Three income thus 
serves as an FID "equalizer." 
To help us distinguish T from T
2
, let us divide (1.3a) by Y1 
b. 




i = 1, 2, ... , r 
b) Sl + s2 + ... s = 1 (by 1. 3bc)r 
and refer to Si as the family's income share of the ith factor. For example, 
if Y = $100 and the family's property income is $40, then the family property 
income share is .4. The Si's permit us to distinguish between T and T .
1 2 
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Equation ( l. 5) shows that the distinguishing characteristic of T
1 
income is that the income share increases for the richer family, while 
for T income the income share decreases.2 
As shown in Diagram lf, property income is typically a T income, i.e.,1 
the percentage of property income is higher for the wealthier family. On 
the other hand, the income from skilled wages in Diagram le illustrates 
a T case, i.e., while this income component increases absolutely, its2 
percentage contribution declines for the wealthier family. The T or unskilled3 
wage income component falls absolutely, as well as relatively. Thus, T1 , T2 and T3 
cases, in this order, represent decreasing contributions to overall FID inequality. 
1 
In the normal case in which there exist several factor income components, 
( 1. 3b) implies 
l. 6) not empty; not empty; 
namely, there must be at least one T asset and at least one T or T asset.1 2 3 
From Y and the ith regression equation, we can calculate an estimated 
Aipattern of factor income W : 
l. 7) a) ... , i = 1, 2, ... , r, where 
Ai 
b) W. = b. + a.Y. j = 1, 2, ... , n; i = 1, 2, ... , r
J l l J 
l 
At any moment of time, the fact that the wealthier family owns more 
property and more educated manpower (and thus derives more income from 
these factors) is a piece of common knowledge which provides the major 
incentive for family investment in human and/or capital resources. Most 
families want to move up the ladder and emulate the wealthier families 
by acquiring more assets of the T and T type, subject, of course, to 
the "family budget constraint" (Y 0 ). Thus2 while the classification of 
factor income and assets (i.e., into T
1 
, T
2 , T ) results at the closed3end of a static model (see above), · the information thus revealed may 
not be irrelevant to an understanding of family saving and investment be­
havior ultimately essential to the construction of a dynamic theory of 
income distribution. Such a theory must take into consideration not only 
an individual family's utility in isolation but also the i~pact of other
families' income and expenditure patterns on its own behavior. 
-9-
The estimated patterns of the various incomes (1.7) can be read off on the 
right hand vertical axes of Diagrams ldef. The following are elementary 
properties for the estimated factor income patterns which follow directly 
from (l.3bc): 
Al A2l.8) a) y = w + w + ... wr 
-i i ~ib) w - (Wil + 
wi
2 
+ ... + W)/n = cwi + wi + ... + w½!n - wn l 2 n 
~i
c) w = b. + a.Y
l l 
d) (by (1.2c) and (l.8b)) 
(l.Ba) states that Y is the additive sum of the estimated pattern. Thus 
Althe estimated wage patterns, W (i = l, 2, ... , r), may be viewed as a 
system of linear approximationsof the original factor income components,
;
W~ (i = l, 2, ... , r), as defined in (l.lb). 
Equation (l.Bb) states that the average factor income per family as 
defined in (1.2b) can be calculated from the estimated pattern. The 
average factor income of the estimated pattern is a linear function of 
average total income (l.Bc). It follows that the distributive shares of (l.2c) can 
be calculated from the estimated pattern as shown in (l.Bd). In our exam-
ple, in Diagram ldef, the average values of total and factor incomes are 
represented by the points E , E, E on the regression lines. Then the slopes~ s u 
of the radial lines OEn, OE 
8
, and OEu represent the three distributive shares. 
In the next section, the decomposition of Y into factor components (l.l) can be 
studied in two steps. The first step is to study the decomposition of Y into the 
approximated system (l.Ba), i.e., under linearity assumptions. The second step is 
to study the deviation of the,original system (Wi) from the linear approximation. 
'I 
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Section II: Inequality1 
Let us adopt the familiar Gini Coefficient G(X) as a measurement of 
the degree of inequality of the non-negative vector X. When total family 
iincome Y and its factor components W (1.1) are given, we can define the 
total Gini, G = G(Y), as well as the factor Ginis, G. = G(Wi) (i=l,2, ... ,r).,Y l 
Furthermore, from the linear approximations Wiaf(l.7a), we can define the 
"estimated" factor Gin.is G(Wi). We then have the following theorem (proved in 
the Appendix) : 
Theorem One 
2.1) a) for a.
l 
~ 0 (Type One, Type Two) 
b) for a.
l 
< 0 (Type Three) 
"i -Notice that a./~. = a./(W /Y) (see 1.8d) is the elasticity of the regression line atl l l 
the "mean point" (in Diagram ldef, the mean points are E , E , E ). In the
1T u s 
case of a Type One or Type Two factor, the elasticity is positive (since 
ai ~ 0), and the "estimated" factor Gini G(Wi) is the product of the total 
Gini G
y 
and the elasticity (2.la). In the case of a Type Three factor (as a. < 0),
l 
the elasticity is negative and thus a negative sign must be attached in 
(2.lb). since the Gini coefficient is always a non-negative fraction. 
l For a fuller treatment of the materials of this section, see
the Appendix. 
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When (1. 8d) is substituted in (2.la), we have (with y > 0) 
a.Y 
2.2) a) G(Wi) = l G . Hence yb.+a.Y 
l l 
b) G(Wi) > G 
y if a. ~o and b. < 0 (Type One income)l l 
c) G(Wi) < G if a. ~o and b. > 0 (Type Two income)y l l 
The theorem states that in the case of a Type One income, the estimated factor 
Gini is greater than the total Gini (2.2b) and the opposite is true for 
Type Two income (2.2c). l When both sides of equation (2.1) for each factor 
2component are multiplied by the relevant¢., we have, after adding:
l 
2.3) where 
r 2b) ¢ (G(W ) (Summed over T and1r 2 T factors by ( 2. la) )2 
r +l 
c) F = ¢ G(W 2 ) + ... + ¢ G(Wr) (Summed over T factor (by 2.lb))r2+1 r 3 
+ - +Thus G 
y 
is the difference between two non-negative terms, F and F, where F 
is the weighted sum of Type One and Type Two terms (i.e., for non-negative 
regression coefficients,a.
l -
> 0) and where F is the weighted sum of the Type 
Three terms(i.e., for a. < 0).
l 
The economic interpretation of the "decomposition equation" (2.3) is 
that the inequality of total family income (G)
y 
may be seen as contributed to 
½his is what we would expect since Type One income is an increasing 
relative share of total income as a family is wealthier and Type Two 
income is a decreasing relative share. 
2 Al A2From (2.1) we have G(W )=(a J¢ )G; G(W )=(a /¢ )G , ... ,1 1 2 2yr +l y
2for Type One and Type Two incomes, and G(W 
A 
) = -(a /¢ ) G, 
r +1 r +1 y
2for Type Three incomes. After multiplying by¢. and aading we have
1
Gy(a + a + ... + ar) = H+ - H- which reduces to (2.3) by (1.3c).1 2 
-l2-
by the inequality of factor distributions (i.e., G(Wi)) depending upon the 
relative size of the distributive shares (<p.) and depending upon the type
l 
of income. Type Three income, as a total income equalizer (see last 
section), contributes to equality rather than inequality as seen from the 
negative Type Three effects, -r- The Type One and Type Two factors 
enter into equation (2.3a) through the positive H+ effect. This term 
can be further divided into the sum of the Type One termsand the sum of 
the Type Two terms. In the Type One term, every G(Wi) is greater than G
y 
(see (2.2b)) and initE'fypeoo term, every G(Wi) is less than G (see (2.2c)).y 
In this sense a Type One term contributes more heavily to inequality than 
a Type Two term. 
In the real world, the original data Wi (l.l) does not, of course, show 
perfect linear correlation with Y. In that case, we can define a non­
linearity .error term for every factor income component: 
2.4) a) e. = (G(Wi) - G. )/G. or
l l l 
b) G(Wi) = G.
l 
+ 0 .G. (i = l, 2, ... , r)
l l 
i.e., e. is the deviation of the estimated factor Gini from the "true factorl 
Gini"--expressed as a fraction of the latter. Wi is correlatedWhen 
nearly perfectly with Y, ~,i is approximately the same as Wi and hence 6.
l 
tends to be zero. For this reason, 6. is called a non-linearity error.
l 
Substituting (2.4b) into (2.3), we have: 
~
2.5) a) G
y = Gy e where 
~
b) G = H+ H and 
c) H+ 
y 
= <plGl + ... + <p G
r2 r2 
-13-












In (2.5a) G may be interpreted as an estimator of G while 0
A 
is the non-y y 
A
linearity error of estimation. The estimator G
y 
is the difference of two posi­
. + - (tive terms, H and H corresponding to F+ and F- in ( 2.3a,) except that 
the true factor Ginis now replace the estimated factor Ginis of the estimated 
income pattern). The non-linearity error term 0 tends toward zero, with in-
creasing high correlation between Y and every W.i Equation (2.5a) also per-
mits us to assign "blame" for overall inequality to the various factor components. 
Dividing both sides by G (and assuming 8 is small), we havey 
2.6) a) where 
b) F. = </>.G./G i = 1, 2, ... , r
l l l y 
where the factor inequality weights (F.) indicate
l 
that factor's con-
tribution to overall inequality or equality. 




of (2.5) reduces to 
A
2.7) a) G = G e
y y 
A
in which the estimator G
y 
is simply the weighted sum of the factor Ginis. 
In this special case, it can be proved (see Appendix) that the non-linearity 
term of (2.7a) is always non-negative, i.e. 
-14-
A
2.8) e > o (no Type Three income) 
A 
so that Galways tends to overestimate the true Gini, G.
y 
Thus in they 
special case when there are no Type Three assets, we can use the approxi-
mation equation of (2.7b) when the non-linearity error term is small. 
That these conditions are satisfied in our particular empirical application 
to the case of Taiwan will be shown below. 
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Section III: Income Distribution and Growth 
We are, of course, not merely interested in the forces determining 
G
y 
at any point in time but even more in what may occasion changes in 
equity over time. The approximation equation which we have just derived 
can be used to analyze the two types of forces that affect the value of G
y 
over time--on the assumption of no Type Three asset and small .non-linearity error. 
To illustrate this, let us assumer= 2 and that the two factor components are 
capital (K) and labor' (L). Then 
3.1) a) G = ¢ G + ~ Gy TT TT ~w w 
b) ¢ · + ¢ = l
w 1T 





distributive shares. Differentiating (3.1) with respect to time "t", we 
have 
dG
3.2) a.) _J_ = A + B wheredt 
wb) A = ¢w(Gw-G1T ) dt 
d¢ 
/¢w (Functional Distribution Effect) 
dG dG




The term A, the functional distribution effect, describes the change of G
y 
due to changes in the relative shares; and B, the factor Gini effect, des-
cribes the change of G due to changes in the fdctor Ginis. Thus the changey 
in overall G
y 
can be traced partly to changes in the functional distribution 
of income and partly to changes in family asset ownership patterns. 
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We may assume that capital is a T asset and labor a T2 asset (see (1.6)).1 
Thus we have, by (2.2): 
3.3) a) G < G which implies that w 1T 
b) The A-effect of (3.2b) is negative if and only if the 
rate of growth of~ is positive (i.e., (d~ /dt/~) > 0).w w w 
Thus, looking only at the A-effect, we see that FID equity improves through 
time when the labor share increases. People are inclined to believe that any 
change in the functional distribution of income favoring the laboring class 
would automatically benefit FID. Our analysis establishes the necessary con­
ditions for this to be true, i.e., wage income must be distributed more equally 
than property income. Moreover (see below) it is not unambiguously true without 
regard to the (much larger) B-effect. 
This analysis of the direction of change of the distributive shares can 
in turn be tied up with the theory of development. In the case of a labor 
surplus economy, as in Taiwan (see below), we can further distinguish between 
two cases, i.e. , before the "turning point," (or before the labor surplus has 
been fully absorbe~, and after the turning point. Before the turning point 
wages may be assumed to be approximately constant and after the turning point 
to be rising rapidly. The growth equations relevant to the analysis of the 
direction of change of~ after the turning point is as follows: w 
3.4) = 
where Eis the elasticity of substitution; B the degree of labor-using bias1 
-17-
of innovations; (and n denotes the time rate of change of any "x'J.
X 
Substituting (3.4) in (3.2b), the A-effect becomes: l 
3.5) 
This permits us to see that FID improves via a negative A-effect (with 
G < G) when technology change is biased in a labor-using directionw 1T 
(BL> 0) and when there is overall capital deepening (nK/L > 0). For 
thes~ are the conditions that improve labor's share (3.4 ). 2 
.Before the turning point,on the assumption of an unlimited supply of 
labor and near constancy in the real wage, (3.4) reduces to the following 
special form: 3 
3.6) a) n~ = BLE - J(l - E) implying that 
w 
b) n > o if and only if l > 0). 
~w 
. Combining (3.5a) with (3.2b), we thus have, before the turning point: 
1For a fuller exposition and derivation of both these equations, see 
Chapter 3 (especially Tableland the appendix to Chapter 3) in the authors' 
Development of the Labor Surplus Economy: Theory and Policy, Irwin, 1964. 
It may be noted that the E used in this paper coincides with the more con­
ventional definition but is the reciprocal of the definition used in the 
aforementioned volume. 
2This is true in the "normal" case, i.e., that of production complemen­
tarity, i.e., when E < l. In the case of production substitutal)ility (E > 1),
it is true, i.e., when there is capital shallowing (nK/L < 0) instead of capital
deepening. 
BL+J3When n =0, the rate of labor absorption is n =n +-- (see Fei and w L KELL 
Ranis, Development of the Labor Surplus Economy, Chapter 3). When 




Thus, during the unlimited supply of labor ph.ase, the FID becomes better 
(lower G)
y 
through a negative A-effect when (3.6b)holds, i.e., when 
technology change is sufficiently biased in a labor-using direction to 
lovercome the innovation intensity effect. 
Thus for a labor surplus economy, a high Janda high BL always con­
tribute to elimination of unemployment and the arrival of the turning point. 
However, income distribution may get worse, through the A-effect, when the 
intensity effect J (El - 1) overwhelms BL. (Statistically this is seen via a 
decrease of ¢wand an increase of Gy.) After the turning point, a higher 
value of BL, combined with capital deepening, will contribute to the improve­
ment of FID. (Statistically, this is seen via a decrease of G
y 
and an in-
crease of BL and nK/L') Whether or not these conditions are met lies behind 
the Kuznets hypothesis concerning the inverse U-shaped time path of Gy 
As far as the B term, i.e., the factor Gini-effect of equation (3.2c), 
is concerned, we see that a negative B, which would contribute to growing 
FID equity,may be caused by a change in the asset ownership patterns of 
either capital or labor or both. On the one hand, the fact that the capital 
ownership pattern has become more equal through time, i.e., dG /dt < O,can
'IT 
occur when the lower income families acquire capital assets faster than the 
which can be reduced to (3.5a) in the text with the help of E =¢/ELL (see
op. cit., p. 85), Comparing (3.5) and (3.7) we can see that the ~ehavior
of¢ is caused by quite different types of forces before and after the
turnYng point. This difference is traced basically to the fact that, before
the turning point, employment is causally determined by capital accumulation
via labor absorption. After the turning point capital and labor are symmet­
rical and the real wage is determined endogenously. 
l In the normal case, E: < 1, a high innovation intensity leads to more
labor absorption and thus a lower K/L ratio, decreasing labor's share. Thus
a high BL contributes to both employment and FID objectives while a high J
contributes to the first but not the second objective. In the abnormal case,
when the technology is substitutable, E: > l, a high J also contributes to a
better FID. In that case, a high Janda high B would contribute to both. . .
l Le imination of unemployment and the improvement of FID. 
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rich families--through a combination of higher savings rates or favorable 
inheritance laws--or if there is a land or capital reform. On the other 
hand, the pattern of ownership of skilled labor can become more equal over 
time, i.e., dG /dt < O, when lower income families manage to acquire morew 
skilled labor through their own education expenditures and/or governments' 
providing free education to the lower income groups. 
Thus, changes in G through time can be traced to two types of forces.y 
First, there is the impact on the functional distribution of income arising 
from such growth-relevant forces as capital accumulation, population growth 
and technology change; here the link between FID and growth theory is quite 
direct. Second, there is the impact on G caused by changes in the equity ofy 
factor asset (and income) distribution patterns as traced to the differentiated 
patterns of family acquisition of human or physical assets,as impacted by 
public policy. Here the relationship to growth theory is less direct and 
requires additional research effort. 
The above analysis can now be generalized when a third factor component 
is added, i.e., r = 3. If that third component is agricultural income A, 
l(3.1) becomes 
3.8) a) G = <p G + ~ G + ~ Gy w w ~TI TI ~A A 
b) <p + <t> + q>A = l 
W TI 
1
Assuming, as before, that there is no Type Three income and that 
the non-linearity error is small. 
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We can easily imagine a dualistic developing country--such as Taiwan (see 
below)--in which families receive income from two production sectors: the 
agricultural sector from which they derive undifferentiated agricultural 
income with distributive shares<PA, and a non-agricultural sector (industry 
and services) with differentiated distributive shares <P and <P for wage
W TT 
and property income, respectively. To emphasize this dualistic feature 
of the economy, equation (3.8) can be rewritten as: 
3.9) a) G = where<PXGX + <PAGAy 
b) <j)X + <P A = l 
c) G = <P'G + <P'G where 
X WW TTTT 
e) ¢'+¢ 1 =1 
w 1T 
In (3.9a), <P is the distributive share of national income generated
X 
by the non-agricultural sector and hence G is the weighted average of the 
y 
two sectoral Ginis GA and Gx. From ( 3. 9d), we see that <P' and cp' are the 
W TT 
two functional distributive shares generated by the non-agricultural sector, 
with (3.9c) indicating that the Gini Coefficient of non-agricultural income 
(G) is the weighted average of the Ginis of non-agricultural wage and 
X 
property income G and G. Notice that (3.9ac) are in the form of (3.lab);
W TT 
1hence, we can apply (3.2) to obtain: 
~otice that (3.10) is really a generalization of (3.2), namely, when 
<PA= 0, (3.10) becomes (3.2). As will be clear below, (3.10) is useful for 
our empirical application to Taiwan; however, it can be generalized to addi­
tional factor components. 
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dG
3.10) a) y - A' + A" + Bdt -
d¢A
b) A' = (G - G) - (Reallocation Effect)A X dt 
d¢'wc) Al' = (G G ) (Functional Distribution Effect)w 1f ¢x dt 
d) (Factor Gini Effect) 
The term B represents the factor Gini effect comparable to (3.2c) above. 
On the other hand, A' and A" represent two types of "A effects" due to the 
change of factor shares (corresponding to (3.2b)). One prominent feature 
of the development of a dualistic economy is that of continuous realloca­
tion of labor from the agricultural to the non-agricultural sectors over 
time. This gradual shift of the economy's center of gravity can be proxied 
by a decline of ¢A, i.e., the share of total national income in the form of 
agricultural income. Thus the term A' in (3.10b) may be referred to as 
the reallocation effect (i.e., related to the reallocation of resources 
from agriculture to non-agriculture). Notice that when such reallocation 
takes place, d¢A/dt is negative. Thus the impact of the reallocation 
effect on overall income distribution equity G in (3.10b) depends upony 
When agricultural income is a Type Two income 
(i.e., GA< Gy), (3.9a) shows Gx must be larger than Gy. Hence, GA - Gx < 0. 
In this case, A' is positive which means that the reallocation effect worsens 
the overall equity of income distribution through the A' effect. Conversely, 
when agricultural income is a Type One income, implying GA - Gx > O, the 
reallocation effect A' is negative and hence reallocation will improve overall 
income distribution equity. In summary, 
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3.11) When the agricultural income share ¢A decreases, the 
impact of the reallocation effect on G is negativey 
(A' < 0) when agriculture is a Type Two income and 
positive (A' > 0) when it is a Type One income. 
The term A11 in (3.lOc) describes the impact on G as traced to they 
functional distribution of income forces within the non-agricultural sector 
of a dualistic economy. All the results obtained earlier for linking growth 
and distribution in the two factor incomes model described by (3.1) can be 
directly applied here. 
Thus we see that in a dualistic economy the equity of tota.l family 
income G
y 
is determined by three types of forces: A', the reallocation 
effect; A11 , the functional distribution effect (in non-agriculture); and 
B, the factor Gini effect. Equation (3.10a) therefore provides a quanti­
tative theoretical framework for linking the theory of FID determination 
with growth. 
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Section IV: Application to Taiwan 
The above ideas on distribution and growth will now be applied to the 
case of Taiwan, which fits the above dualistic economy typology. The 
ln-households are divided into c urban and n-c rural households. The total 
. . Wu ( u uThe urban households receive wage income = w1 , w2 , ... ' Wu) and propert yC 
income TIU(= TI~, TI~, ... , TI~) generated in urban production activities, such 
as large and small-scale urban industries and services. The rural households 
receive wage income Wr = (Wr
1 , 
wr 
2 , ... , 
wr ) and propert y income· n-c 
r r r rTI = (TI1 , TI 2 , ... , TI ) from rural industrial and service activities as n-c 
well as income from agricultural activities A(= A1 , A2 , ... , An_c). Thus 
we may employ three models of decomposition to analyze income distribution 
trends in Taiwan, i.e., for urban families, for rural families and for all 
families: 
4.1) a) Urban family decomposition: Yu= Wu+ Tiu 
II IIb) Rural 
II IIc) All 
The urban model of (4.la), with two income components, can make use of the 
framework of analysis provided by (3.1) in the last section, while the rural 
and all family models (4.lbc) containing three factor components, can make 
use of (3.8). 
1Ideally, one should be working with individual families. But, for 
practical purposes, since it is difficult to work with millions of individual 
observations, income distribution data is usually grouped by income intervals. 
In the application to Taiwan (see below), the household surveys used actually 
grouped then-families into 23 to 32 such class intervals. 
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The data for Taiwan are based on sample surveys starting in 1964 and 
have been processed in accordance with this understanding. 1 The results 
are summarized in Tablesl a, b, c. 
For "all households," Table la [rows (1), (2), (3), (4)] presents the fac­
tor Ginis for each of the three component factor incomes (Gw, Gn, GA) and the 
total Ginis (G
y 
). The factor distributive shares (¢ ,¢ ,¢A) are found in 
W TT 
rows (5),(6),(7). The regression coefficients a. and the regression constants 
l 
1
The first estimates of income distribution for the whole Taiwanese 
economy were undertaken by Professor Kowie Chang of National Taiwan Uni­
versity for 1953 and again for 1959 and 1961. These surveys were onbased 
samples of only 301 and 812 observations, respectively. The first official 
surveys were made for 1964 by the Directorate General of Budget, Accounting
and Statistics (DGBAS). Surveys have been carried on for every alternate 
year between 1964 and 1970 and for every year since then, with sample size 
ranging between l. 3% and l. 9%. These data are subject to a number of de­
ficiencies, including the underestimation of high incomes, the inability 
to separate property from wage income in the (lumped) category of agricul­
tural income, and the separation of Taipei City from the rest of Taiwan 
since 1970. (For a fuller statement of the data availabilities, as well as 
deficiencies, see Wanyong Kuo, "Income Distribution by Size in Taiwan Area-­
Changes and Causes," paper presented to joint JERC-CAMS Seminar on "Income 
Distribution, Employment and Economic Development in Southeast and East 
Asia," Tokyo, December 1974.) However, the overall quality of the DGBAS 
data--which we have concentrated on to date--compares favorably with that 
of most countries, certainly other LDC's. The information is available by
type of income and is broken down by farm and non-farm families--as well as 
by education, sex and age of head of household, breakdowns which have not 
yet been utilized at this stage of our analysis. The farm, non-farm break­
down unfortunately only begins in 1966. 
In transforming the raw data into the simplifying framework of (4.1)
the following assumptions should be noted: l) a category of unallocatable 
"miscellaneous income" for all families is neglected, as is the agricultural
income of urban families since both are quantitatively small (see below);
2) the absence of inter-sectoral payments (e.g., wr may contain some "farmers' 
daughters'"income in the city) due to the impossibility of isolating such pay­
ments in the_data; 3) agricultural income A is not functionally iisaggregated
into a wage and property share; in a family farm type of agriculture, such a 
separation would have required a rather arbitrary imputation procedure. 
2The relative shares do not add up to l since we neglected the merged 
category of "mixed incomes" which adds up to less than 10% of the total. 
Table la 
All Households 
1964 1966 1968 1970 1971
1 ) G 0.2434 o. 2760 0.3037 0.2763 0.2558w
: fFactor Ginis G 0.4664 0.4233 0.4721 0.4451 0.43191f 
GA 0.3669 0.3564 0.2286 0.1437 0.1771 
4 Total Gini G
y 0.3282 0.3300 0.3346 0.2951 0.2837 
qiw 0.4324 0.4760 0.5066 0.5405 0.58475 1Factor 
6 Distributive qi1f o. 2401 0.2557 0.2777 · 0.2370 0.2353 
7 Shares 0.2754 0.2118qi A 0.1523 0.1614 0.1233 
8 ~ 1 aw 0.2457 0.3658 0.4774 0.4347 0. 4471 
9 -~ j Slopes (a) a 0.4849 0.3653 0.3547 0.4055 0.40141f 









b -7.3210 -3.6783 -3.1270 -7.4438 -8.0907(b) 1f 
13 1 
·rl
~ J bA l. 3952 0.5840 3.9331 4.5506 l. 8545- ....:I 
14 'd 
.µ
Q) ) r w 0.8849 0.9743 0.9545 0.9561 0.9286 
15 ..c: 'r Correla-
•rl
bO Jtions (r) r 1f 0.8896 0. 9696 0.9272 0.9445 0.9411 
Q)16 ::,:: rA 0.8125 0.8871 0.5972 0.7923 0.5372 
,:-
17 Weighted Gini Gy 0.3341 0.3347 0.3454 0.3004 0.2893 
Non-Linearity A ~18 
Error 0=Gy -Gy 0.0059 0.0047 0. 0108 0.0053 0.0056 
Degree of19 
Overestimation Dy=8/Gy 0.0178 0.0142 0.0324 0.0178 0.0198 
20 } Factor F =qi G /G 0.3205 0.3980 0.4598 0.5061 0.5272w w w y
21 Inequality F =qi G /G 0.3411 0.3279 0.3918 0.3575 0.35821f 1f1f y
22 Weights FA=qiAGA/Gy 0.3078 0.2287 0.1041 0.0786 o. 0770 
23 
Relative, 
GiniWage- Gw/G1f 0.5219 0.6520 0.6433 0.6208 0.5923 
24 Profits JShare qi w/cp 1f l. 8009 l. 8616 l. 8243 2.2806 2.4849 
25 } Relative Gw
/G
y 0.7416 0.8364 0. 9077 0.9363 0.9017 
26 Factor G /G 1.4211 l. 2827 1.4109 l. 5083 l. 52241f y




















































4 Total Gini G y 0.3315 0.3386 0.2839 0.2710 0.2724 
5 } Factor cpw 0.5925 o. 5627 0.6137 0.6519 0.6468 
6 Distributive cp 1T 0.3218 0.3366 0.2914 0.2686 0. 2792 











0.4539 0.3620 0.4445 0.4632 0.3871 
10 ~ bO aA 0.0132 0.0201 o. 0271 0.0219 0.0135 
--, ~ 
11 b 
w 4.7243 3.0842 9.0566 9.6453 7.6094 




-4.5008 -1.1337 -7.5145 -10.0475 -6.4728 





















16 OJ ::;:: rA 0.5835 0.5453 0.6989 0.7871 0.6455 
~ 





0=G -G y y 0.0052 0.0086 0.0053 0.0058 0.0044 
Degree of
19 Overestimation 
20 l Factor 
21 Inequality 
D.=0/Gy y 
F =cf> G /Gw w w y 
F =cp G /G
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27 Ginis GA/Gy 0.9831 l. 2047 0.9581 l. 0871 0.9872 
Table le 
Farm Households 
1966 1968 1970 1971 1972 
l G 
w 0.2245 0.3121 0.2138 0.2332 0.2439 
2 
3 


























































~ aA o. 7205 0.6553 0.5244 0.4932 0. 4396 - ~ 
11 



































17 Weighted Gini G 





y y 0.0125 0.0129 0.0070 0.0085 0.0135 
19 
Degree of 
Overestimation D =8/Gy y 0.0385 0.0448 0.0247 0.0285 0.0135 






















































are shown in rows (8) to (l3).l The correlation coefficients are 
shown in rows (14},(15),(16). 
A
In verifying (2.7a), G
y 
of (2.7b) (i.e., the weighted average of the 




linearity error defined as G - G
A 
y y 
in (2.7a)) is shown in row (18). Finally, 




), i.e., the linearity error as a fraction of the true 
Gini in row (19). The factor inequality weights of (2.6) are shown in rows (20)-(2~ 
and selected relative distributive shares and relative Ginis are presented 
in rows (23)-(27). Tables le and lb are identical for farm households and 
non-farm households, respectively. 2 
To provide better visual overview of the time series the data in 
Tables labc are also summarized in Diagrams 2, 3, and 4, respectively, for 
the three models; the six panels (ABCDEF) of these diagrams correspond to 
the classification by rows of Table labc. Our empirical analysis will con­
centrate on the pattern of these indices, central to the analytical framework 
we have evolved, in the course of Taiwan's development. Each of the major 
relevant findings (F) will be stated and its significance in the 
context of our analytical framework explored. 
F.l: For all three models, property income is a Type One income and 
wage income is a Type Two income. Hence, G < G < G.w - y 7T 




are both positive (panel E, Diagrams 2, 3, 4) while b is positive and b isw 7T 
¼or the same reason cited in footnote l above,. the a's don't quiteadd up to land the b's don't quite add up to 0. 
2
The reader should note from Table lb that agricultural income
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negative (panel F, DiagraTIE2,3,4). The economic interpretation of this is 
that the share of wage income decreases and the share of property income 
increases as the family gets wealthier. This leads to the phenomenon shown 
in panel A (Diagrams 2,3,4), i.e., a consistent straddling of the total Gini 
curve G
y 
by the two factor Ginis G
W 
and G , as wage income is distributed
TT 
more equally than total income which is, in turn, distributed more equally 
. lhtan property income. 
F.2: Agricultural Income is a Type One income for Rural Households and 
a Type Two income for All Households. 
This finding can be readily detected in Panels E and F of Diagrams 2 
and 4. 
2 
It suggests that the GA curve lies above the Gy curve :for farm 
households (panel A, Diagram 4) while the opposite is generally true for 
the all households model (Panel A, Diagram 2). The economic interpretation 
of this is that, for rural families, the income share traced to agricultural 
income increases with total family income, while, by implication, the 
share of non-agricultural income (from rural industries) declines. Thus, 
while non-agricultural income sources are unusually important in Taiwan for 
all rural families'(see below), they are especially important for the rela­
tively poor rural families. Rural industries thus serve as an important income 
"equalizer" as far as the rural families are concerned. From the point of 
view of the whole economy, i.e., the All Families model, on the other hand, 
the share of income from agriculture decreases with total family income--
l 
See (2.1) and (2.2). The reader might recall that this theorem was
established for the "expected" rather than the actual factor income pattern.
However, in view of the high correlation coefficients (rows (14)-(16)) in­
dicating a high degree of linearity, the G < G < G relation is seen to be
valid for the actual factor Ginis as well. w &I ¥xamiiiation of row ( 23) in
Tables lb and le shows no significant difference in the G /G ratio for the
two sectors. W TT 
2In other words, aA is always positive while bA is positive in Diagram 2
but negative in Diagram 3. 
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for the obvious reason that the wealthier families 
derive an increasing portion of their incomes from non-agricultural sources, 
especially property income (also see F.l). 
F.3: It follows from (F.l) and (F.2) that there is no Type Three income 
l
in the Taiwan case. 
This means that the Gini approximation equation in (2.7) above can be 
used in which the overall Gini is simply the weighted average of the factor 
Ginis. In the absence of any Type Three income (or error) the remaining non-
A 
A 
linearity error is always non-negative (see (2.8)) and G overestimates G. y y 
Moreover, the size of the non-linearity error 
A 
0 and of the Gini Error Frac-
tion D (see row (19), Tables la, b, c and curve D in Panel A of Diagrams
y y 
2, 3, 4) is uniformly small. In fact, the non-linearity error is so small
2 
that D never exceeds 3% for all three models and that the approximation
y 
0 3
equation therefore overestimates the true Gini by less than 3~. For this 
reason we can safely neglect the non-linearity error term and use equation 
(3.1) for the non-farm family model and equation (3.8) for the farm family 
and all families models. 
1
A quantitatively small category of "transfers" which we have neglected 
does show up in the data but it does not decrease absolutely with total 
family income. At a more disaggregated level some Type Three income 
would undoubtedly appear, but,it does not appear at any reasonable level of aggre­
gation. However, since the analysis of Type Three income is theoretically 
interesting and may be of practical policy importance, e.g., in a fiscal 
redistribution context, we have pursued it fully in the Appendix. 
2
The very low non-linearity error is also demonstrated by the consistently 
high values of the correlation coefficients in rows (14),(15), f, (16) of Tables la,h 
3In Panel A of Diagrams 2, 3, 4, the estimated Gini is shown by the 
dotted curve. The gap between it and the true Gini, the curve, indicates 
the size of the (non-negative) Gini error term. 
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In summary, then, the following decomposition equation may be employed 
in our further empirical analysis of the Taiwanese case: 
4.2) a) All Households: 
G = ¢ G + ¢ G + ¢AGA (with G < G < G and G < G )y WW 1f1f w- y- 1f A - y 
b) Farm Households: 
G = ~ G + ¢ G + ¢ G (with G < G < G and G > G )y ~w w 1r 1r A A w- y- 1f A - y 
c) Non-Farm Households: 
G = ¢ G + ¢ G (with G < G < G)y w w 1f 1f w-y-1r 
The primary objective of this analysis is, of course, to attempt to 
identify the causes of the change in G 
y 
through time. The decomposition 
equations of (4.2) provide a framework for this effort which is partly 
deductive and partly inductive. We begin by identifying the thr·ee effects on 
the Gini, i.e., the reallocation effect, the functional distribution effect and 
the factor Gini effect as derived from (3.2) and (3.10). Since these three 
causative effects are defined in terms of the various factor Ginis G. and factor 
l 
shares¢., our analysis proceeds by first inductively examining the time patternl 
of these G. 
l 
's and ¢. 
l 
's and, by appealing to growth theory, explaining their 
pattern of behavior and their relation to the overall Ginis. The impact of 
these effects on the three overall Ginis (for all families, farm families and 
non-farm families) are then handled both qualitatively--in terms of the direc­
tion of impact--and then quantitatively--in terms of their precise empirical 
contribution. 
Our findings are recorded in Table 2 below; its organization is self-
explanatory. Our findings, first qualitative, i.e., the F's, then quantitative, 
i.e., the numerical (or percentage) contributions of the various effects to 
changes in the relevant Ginis, are recorded in each cell. 
We begin with an examination of the overall index of FID equity in Taiwan 
and observe that 
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F.4: For the whole economy (all families) G 
y 
shows a slightly increasing 
trend between 1964 and 1968 and declines consistently and markedly 
thereafter (Diagram 2, Panel A). 
The recognition of the existence of a "turning point11 around 1968 
indicates that the so-called Kuznets thesis concerning an inverse U-shaped 
pattern of distribution over time applies, although it is much less pro-
nounced than in other LDCs. 1 The fact that 1968 appears as something of 
a turning point from the viewpoint of FID analysis is highly significant 
also because it confirms conclusions reached independently with respect to 
the overall development process in post-war Taiwan. Some of the authors' 
earlier work indicates that it was around this time that the labor supply 
d . . ' ' ' d f 2con ition came to an end as real wages began to rise in a sustaine ash'ion. 
This suggests the existence of a close relationship between growth and income 
distribution patterns, in particular that once a labor surplus economy has 
succeeded in making full use of its labor force and turned labor• into a 
scarce factor for the first time, the resulting marked increases in the 
3real wage are likely to lead to a marked improvement in FID. 
Since the whole economy--or all families--represents merely an aggre­
gation of the rural and urban families, an examination of G fo:r• the two y 
sectors separately permits a number of additional observations: 
1
This "mildness" of the Kuznets effect when coupled with the (by 
comparative international standard~ overall low level of G (see, e.g., 
Redistribution with Growth, Chenery, Ahluwahlia, Bell, Dulay and Jolly, 
Oxford University Press, 1974) provided, in fact, a major motivation 
for the present study. 
2 
see Fei and Ranis, "A Model of Growth and Employment in the Open 
Dualistic Economy: The Cases of Korea and Taiwan," Journal of Development 
Studies, forthcoming. A vertical line is drawn in Diagrams 2, 3, 4 to 
indicate the role of 1968 as a turning point (or part of a "turning range")·
similarly, Table 2 is broken down into the period before and after 1968. ' 
3More work on the historical relationship between growth phases and 
FID behavior is indicated, especially for the earlier (pre-1964) period. 
Kowie Chang's data indicate a much higher overall Gini (in the .5 range) 
for the S0's than the 60 1s, indicating the possibility of another sub­
stantial turning point (and marked improvement in FID) as the economy 
moved from import-substitution to export substitution in the early 60 1 s. 
(On a discussion of this export substitution point, see Fei and Ranis, ibid.) 
But the present paper restricts itsel.f to an analysis of the post-1964 period. 
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F.5: For farm households, the total Gini G declines slightly before they 
turning point (1968) and remains relatively constant thereafter. For 
non-farm households, on the other hand, the slight increase bf G-----------.C....---------~----~--------y-
before the turning point gives way to a consistent and significant 
decline thereafter (Diagrams 3, 4, Panel A). 
The differentiated sectoral G pattern observed here gets at they 
heart of the problem of FID which we seek to explain. We see that the 
slightly inverse U-shaped pattern of G for the whole economy (see (F.4))y 
is basically a reflection of the G for the urban families. This is duey 
primarily to the fact that the income of the urban families accounts for 
a larger and increasing share of the national income relative to that of 
the rural families. The role of the rural and urban sectors of Taiwan in 
the course of development is by no means symmetrical. Quite to the contrary, 
the exhaustion of the economy's labor surplus around 1968 was the result of 
a process of rapid labor reallocation from the agricultural to the indus-
trial sectors during the 60 1 s. 1 The empirical evidence suggests that, 
before the turning point, as the agricultural sector gradually loses its 
surplus labor, the income distribution improves for the rural households 
while worsening for the urban households. It is reasonable to expect such 
a result as labor reallocation can be expected to reduce the weight of the 
poorest families in lower average income agricultural activities and at the same 
time increase the weight of the poor families in the higher aver•age income non­
agricultural activities. This pattern can no longer be observed. after the turning 
1
As we have found earlier (see Fei, Ranis, op. cit.), this rate of
labor reallocation proceeded at a rate in excess of 6% annually during
the 60 1 s. 
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point when there is a reduction in the average income gap between the rural 
and urban families. 1 
The pattern of the income distribution equity over time can now be 
analyzed more precisely with the help of equation (3.10)--for the all 
families and rural families models--and equation (3.2)--for the urban 
families model. These equations, it will be recalled, permit us to de-
compose changes in the overall Gini into reallocation effects, functional 
distribution effects and factor Gini effects. 2 Concentrating first on the 
reallocation effect, i.e., the decline of the agricultural income (share <PA), 
this effect is relevant to both the all households and the rural households 
models. Our empirical evidence indicates the following: 
F.6: For the whole economy, the distributive share of agricultural income 
i_<p-A) drops consistently for the whole period ( 1 64- 1 72)--with the drop 
more pronounced before the turning point (Diagram 2, Panel D). 
This decline of <PA is associated with the rapid reallocation of labor 
from agricultural to non-agricultural activities in the course of a rapid 
industrialization process. 3 The most rapid reallocation actually took place 
after 1960 during the so-called "export substitution phase 11 of Taiwanese 
economic development characterized by the rapid absorption of rural manpower 
1For more discussion on the inter- vs. intra-sectoral explanation of 
the overall FID pattern, see below. It is true that labor reallocation 
continues after the turning point; however, labor is now a scarce commodity, 
the wage gap between the sectors has narrowed and further reallocation 
no longer improves G for farm families or worsens it for non-farm families.y 
2They are derived by differentiating the approximation equations 
summarized in (4.2) with respect to time. 
3The proportion of the labor force in non-agriculture increased from 
42% of the total in 1952-54 to 58% of (a much larger) total in 1967-69. 
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in labor intensive export-oriented industries. 1 It was this particular 
pattern of rapid growth which produced the "reallocation effect" on the 
Gini for the whole economy. Its impact on FID can be traced as follows: 
F.7: For the whole economy, the reallocation of labor from agricultural 
to non-agricultural production (i.e., the decline of ¢A) contributes 
to the worsening of the overall equity of income distribution, i.e., 
an increase of G.
y-
The fact that the reallocation effect works against the equity of income 
distribution follows directly from (F. 6) (i.e. , ¢A declines) and ( F. 2) 
(i.e., GA < Gy). Since agricultural income acts as an "income equalizer" 
for the whole economy, the decline of its importance or relative share 
thus worsens the overall distribution of income. (Technically, (F.7) can 
be seen from the fact that the term A' in (3.lOb) is positive.) The labor 
allocated out of agriculture will move partly into larger-scale urban non­
agricultural activities and partly into rural industry and services. This 
means that rural households receive an ever-increasing share of their incomes 
from non-agricultural employment. That this has happened in a quantitatively 
very significant way is confirmed by the following observable characteristic: 
F.8: For the rural households, the distributive shares of non-agricultural 
income(=¢+¢ ) represent a quantitatively important income component-----'--W TT-'----"-------'"---'------"--'"-----------=---
which increases consistently throughout the whole period (Diagram 4, 
Panel D). 
1Industrial exports as a percentage of (a rapidly growing) total export
rose spectacularly from 40% of the total in 1958 to 89% in 1967-69. (Indus­
trial exports rose from $16 per capita in 1952-54 to $223 in 1967-69.)
(See Fei, Ranis, op. cit.) 
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The fact that non-agricultural income (l-¢A=¢ +¢) generated by
7f w 
rural industry and services has always been an important source of rural 
family incomes is seen from the fact that¢ + ¢ was about 30% from thew 7f 
_very beginning. It is even more noteworthy that this share has climbed to 
60% in the short span of six years (68-72) so that it has become the dominant 
source of income at the end of our period of observation. The pattern which has 
emerged gives evidence of a rather unique spatially dispersed industrializa­
tion pattern. The relative importance of this non-agricultural rural activity 
can also be seen from the fact that value added in rural industry constituted 
about 20% of value added in urban industry, on the average, during this period. 
Hence, a study of the FID of Taiwan, especially its rural households, must 
pay special attention to this unusually large rural industry component. 1 
This substantial shift of the source of rural family income helped produce 
a reallocation effect beneficial to the income distribution pattern of 
these families, as follows: 
F.9: For the rural households, the increased share of non-agricultural 
income(¢ +¢)contributes to an improvement in the equity of their-----7f w----------------------~-~-----
distribution of income, G •
y-
That the above reallocation effect works to improve equity (lower G)
y 
follows directly from (F.5) and (F.6). As we pointed out earlier, for rural 
households non-agricultural income is an "income equalizer" and hence the 
increase of its weight or distributive share will improve the rural families' 
equity of income distribution. (Technically, this is seen from the fact 
that the term A' in (3.10b) is now negative.) 
1
certainly by any international LDC standards (see Sharing in Develop­
ment, ILO, 1974, Special Paper #9 on "Medium-Scale and Small-Scale Industry." 
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Let us turn now to the functional distribution effect, i.e., the impact (on 
changes in FID)caused by variations in the relative wage-profit share ratio 
¢. /~ prevailing in non-agricultural activities. This effect may be tracedw 7f 
to the production conditions and the functional distribution forces within 
the non-agricultural sector. 1 The time path of¢. /<p for all three models w 7f 
is shown in Diagram 5 for purposes of comparison. From this diagram we 
can see that 
F.10: The relative share ratio¢./¢. is higher for rural non-agricultural--------------wn----=-----------=------
activities than for urban non-agricultural activities. Moreover</>------------------'=------------------- w 
exceeds </> • ( i. e. , 1 < ( </> /</> ) b < ( </> /</> ) • ) 
----- 7f w 7f ur an w 7f rura1 
The economic interpretation of this finding is that the wage share is 
larger than the property share· in both sectors 2 and that rural industries 
(and services) are relatively more (in fact, almost twice as) labor inten-
sive than their urban counterpart. 3 Thus one unit of capital provides more 
employment in rural than in urban non-agricultural activities. Such a 
characterization of the comparative advantage between the two types of 
industries is indeed what we would expect to find. 4 
1
Tt is obviously not relevant in the case of lumped
agricultural income •. 
2
Notice that the</>/</> is merely a weighted average of the sectoral 
values. Thus in Diagra.fh s: the</>/</> curve for the whole economy lies in 
the middle and close to that of trfe ITrban ratio because of its relatively 
heavier weight. Since the overall </> /</> ratio is merely an aggr'egative
index for the two sectoral ratios, w¥ s~all only emphasize the two sectoral 
values in our analysis of this section. 
3
If pis the wage-profit or factor-price ratio applying to both sectors 
(i.e., there are no factor-price distortions), and Kt: and K~': represent the 
capital-labor ratio for rural and urban non-agricultfu>e, reltpectively, the 
inequality in (F.10) implies that p/K* > p/K* or K* > K*, i.e., for the same p,
the capital per head in urban industries is ~arger~whicfi is the conventional 
definition of "relatively high capital intensity." 
4rt supports our earlier finding that the development of rural industries 
pl~yed a crucial role in solving the unemployment or underemployment problem inTaiwan. 
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The time i:attern of the relative shares¢/¢ in Diagram 5 shows a. w if 
generally increasing trend over the time span (66-68) although there are 
periods of decline--indicated by the "broken line" portions of these curves--in 
both sectors. These observed patterns may be described as follows: 
F.11: For urban industries, the time path of¢/¢ is U-shaped, i.e.,w if 
the relative labor share decreases before the turning point (1968) 
and increases after the turning point. For the rural industries, 
the relative labor share(¢/¢) increases consistently over the--------------w if·~-------------=-------
whole period (with the exception of one year). 
These time patterns may be explained with the help of growth theory 
introduced earlier. In the period before the turning point when the real 
wage is relatively stable (i.e., the surplus labor condition exists), the 
necessary and sufficient condition for the upturn of¢/¢ is that thew if 
labor using bias effect of technology change,B
1
,overwhelms the intensity 
of innovation effect, J (see (3.6)). Finding (F.11) immediately suggests 
that this holds in rural industry but fails to hold in large scale urban 
industry. The significance of this is that when the surplus labor condi­
tion obtains, i.e., before the turning point, rural non-agricultural ac­
tivities are more technologically responsive to the ample supply of cheap 
labor than large scale urban industries. 
In the period after the turning point, when the labor surplus condition 
is exhausted and real wages begin to increase significantly, the necessary 
and sufficient condition for¢/¢ to increase through time is given byw if 
(3.4), namely, a combination of industrial capital deepening and labor 
using technology bias. Since capital deepening does occur in both indus­
trial sectors after the turning point, all we need is that techr:.ology 
----------------
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bias is not so labor-saving as to overwhelm the increased capital intensity 
. l 
to ensure the observed result. It should also be noted (see Diagram 5) 
that the difference in relative factor shares (or capital intensity) in the 
two sectors narrows somewhat after the turning point. 
The gain in Taiwan's competitive position in world export markets at 
this time may be traced mainly to increases in the productive efficiency 
of her labor intensive industrial exports (i.e., due to the combination of 
entrepreneurial capacities with abundant labor,utilizing labor-using techno­
logical innovations). Assuming that the origin of these exports is initially 
in rural based industry but, with increasing skill and technology content, 
shifts gradually toward urban industry permits us to explain why the urban 
and rural¢/¢ ratios diverge before the turning point but move closerw 'IT 
together thereafter when wage gaps narrow and industrial dualism disappears. 
Having identified the growth related causation of the change in the 
relative distributive shares¢/¢, we can easily summarize the impact of thesew 'IT 
growth related forces on FID with the aid of term A" corresponding to the 
"functional distribution effect" in (3.10c). Generally, 
F.12: An increase of the relative distributive share¢/¢ in favor of--------------------------w 'IT-------
the laboring class always improves the equity of overall FID. 2 
Hence, before the turning point, the strong labor using bias of 
innovations contributes to FID equity among rural families while a rela-
tively lower labor using bias serves to slightly worsen FID among urban 
families. After the turning point, capital deepening and the labor using 
bias of innovations affect FID favorably for both rural and urban households 
and for the whole economy. 
1Th . . . d " " . abis, again, is un er normal assumptions out factor non-
substitutability(£< 1). 
2we should recall that this follows directly from the fact (see (F.l))
that wage income is always distributed more equaily than property income. 
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Turning, finally, to the factor Gini effect, let us recall that the 
reallocation effect and the functional distribution effect refer to the impact on FIL 
traced to changes in the functional distribution of income, t., holding
l 
the factor Gini constant. The factor Gini effect, on the other hand, 
refers to the impact on FID traced to variations of the factor Gini through 
time. It should be noted that we have tried to understand the.underlying 
causation of the variation of the income shares (t.) in terms of certain . l 
familiar growth relevant forces--reallocation between agriculture and 
non-agriculture in the dualistic economy and changes in the factor shares. 
The causation of the variation of factor Ginis through time, on the other 
hand, represents a more difficult area which has to rely on as yet less 
well understood theoretical issues. While we shall proceed to identify 
certain important observable characteristics of the time patterns of the 
factor Ginis, attempts to "explain" these patterns can be little more than 
intelligent guesses at this stage of our understanding. 
Since family incomes are generated by two types of productive activities 
(agricultural and non-agricultural) in the dualistic economy, let us first 
concentrate on non-agricultural income--i.e., property and wage income 
arising in industry and services. The time pattern of the factor Ginis 
for these incomes are shown in Diagram 6. From this diagram, a number 
of observable characteristics can be identified: 
F.13: The total wage income Gini is lower than the total property income Gini, 
i.e., total wage income is distributed more equally than total 
property income (Curves I, II, III lie above Curves IV, V and VI in Diagram 6) 
This observable characteristic is merely a further strengthening of 
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here is stronger in that it refers to cross-sectoral comparisons, e.g., 
the G for all households is less than the G for farm households. This 
W TT 
stronger conclusion enables us to make the intuitively obvious and uncon-
ditional statement that it is the existing inequality in the distribution 
of the ownership of property which makes a substantial contribution to 
overall income distribution inequity. 
F.14: For each functional type of income (i.e., wage or property), both 
sectoral factor Ginis (i.e., the factor Gini for the farm and for 
the non-farm households)lie below the factor Ginis for the economy 
as a whole. 
With respect to property income, Curve II and III lie below Curve I (Diagram 6). 
Similarly, for wage income, Curves V and VI lie below Curve IV. The common 
sense of this phenomenon is that if you segment a population into a 
relatively rich and relatively poor component, i.e., there is a significant 
gap between the average incomes of the two components, the Ginis for the 
two (now more homogeneous) components tend to be lower than for the popula­
1tion as a whole. Diagram 7 indicates a substantial gap between the average 
wage income in the urban and the rural sectors (wu and wr). The same thing holds 
1
For example, taking the extreme case of seven families segmented into 
three relatively low income rural families and four relatively high income 
urban families, Y = (Yu,yr)=[(l,l,1),(100,100,100)] so that within each 
sector (i.e., (1,1,1) and (100,l00,lo0)) the degree of equity of income 
distribution is perfect,while for the whole economy the Gini is quite high. 
In Theil's terminology, T(Y) is the sum of the weighted average of inequality 
within each sector and the inequalities between the sectors. 
Diagram 7 
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narrowing of this gap follows directly from the argument above (F.15) 
explaining the existence of the gap. Thus,after the turning point in 1968, 
the forces making for a gap between rural and urban industries tend to 
weaken. As the labor surplus is exhausted and the entire economy becomes 
increasingly subject to competitive market forces, we can expect the trend 
for a narrower gap with respect to both the ownership of capital and the 
heterogeneity in quality and bargaining power of the labor force, as between 
rural and urban industries, to set in. 
F.lS: For each functional income component, the gap between the total 
Gini and the sectoral Gini tends to narrow. 
This is due to the narrowing of the gap between the average income 
from wages--and profits--in the urban and rural sectors after the turning 
-u -rpoint, as clearly shown in Diagram 7. This gap (w /w) for wages declined from 
2.3 in 1968 to 1.9 in 1972, and ~u;;r)for profits declined from 4-.7 in 1968 to 3.2 
in 1972. 
Thus, in the brief post-turning point era under observation, there is 
a tendency for a conver>gmce in the rural and urban property and wage Ginis. 
The gap between the equity of wage and property incomes as a whole, on the 
other hand, is not reduced and must be viewed as a longer term phenomenon. 
Up to this point we have been focusing mainly on the comparative 
magnitudes of the factor Ginis for industrial activity as identified in 
Diagram 6. Concentrating more fully on the time pattern of these curves, 
a look at Curves I and V permits us to observe that 
F.19: Total industrial property and wage income show an inverse U-shaped 
pattern,with 1968 as a turning point. 
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-u -rfor the gap between average urban and rural property incomes (n and n ). 
F.15: For each functional factor income component, the factor Gini for 
the farm households is smaller than that of the non-farm households. 
In Diagram 6, Curve III lies below Curve II--for property 
income--and Curve V lies above Curve VI--for wage income. This 
means that the ownership of capital assets in the larger-scale urban in-
dustries is more unequally distributed than that of rural industries. 
Such a high concentration of ownership supported by a highly imperfect 
capital market is a pronounced feature of the industrial structure in LDCs. 
Furthermore, the wage income generated by urban industries is also more 
unequally distributed than that by rural industries, since urban industries 
are characterized by a greater skill heterogeneity of the labor force, more 
unionized labor, greater impact of minimum wage legislation, etc .• 
F.16: Notice that the above three properties, (F.13), (F.14), and (F.15), 
together establish the complete ordering of all six components shown 
in Diagram 6. 
The net result is that property income in the urban indust1~ies tends 
to be more unequally distributed than the wage income of rural industries. It is 
for this reason, everything else being equal, that overall inequality is more related 
to the concentration of capital in the urban sector and less to the inequality 
of wage income in the growing rural industries. 
F.17: For each functional income component, the gap between the two 
sectoral factor Ginis tends to narrow after the turning point. 
In Diagram 6, we may note that, for property income, the gap between 
Curves II and III tends to narrow over time. Similarly, for wage income, 
the gap between Curves V and VI tends to narrow. The explanation for the 
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We will recall (from (F.4)) that the overall distribution of income, 
G,
y 
exhibits the same inverse U-shaped characteristic, which is, in fact, 
what we are basically trying to explain. Thus, there is a prima facie case 
for the factor Gini effect due to industrial income providing a large part 
of the explanation for the pattern of the overall Gini. We may also note 
that (Diagram 6, Curves II and V,and III and VI) 
F.20: Within each of the (urban and rural) industrial production sectors, 
the two factor Ginis (G and G) behave consistently, i.e.,
------------ W--- TI-----------~---
a) for the urban industries they are nearly constant before the 
turning point and decline consistently thereafter (i.e., inverse 
U-shaped) 
b) for the rural industries they fall somewhat before the turning 
point and rise consistently thereafter (i.e., U-shaped). 
c) for both industries, taken together, they increase before and 
fall after the turning point. 
These results merit a number of additional observations: 
l) With respect to the consistency of the movement of G and G,
W TI 
and taking urban industries as an example, we know there exists a dualistic 
structure within such industries--with the large-scale organized subsector 
hiring higher quality and/or unionized workers and the smaller-scale 
subsector hiring lower quality and/or unorganized labor. The existence 
of such dualism usually connotes the prevalence of a substantial wage gap 
as well as a gap in the rate of return to capital favoring the larger scale. 
l 
1see Sharing in Development: A Programme of Employment, Equity and 
Growth for the Philippines, ILO, Geneva, 1974; also, 
Little, Scitovsky and Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries, 
Oxford University Press, 1970. 
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The stronger this dualism, the wider these gaps and therefore the more 
unequal the distribution of wage and property income. The inverse U-shaped 
pattern shown by urban industry indicates the increasing orientation toward 
dualism before the turning point and the decreasing orientation thereafter. 
1 
2) Given the time pattern of the six industrial factor Ginis pictured 
in Diagram 6, we can thus unambiguously discuss the direction of the factor 
Gini effects for each of the relevant total G. 
y 
Since wage and property 
Ginis for each model move consistently 
F.21: The factor Gini effect of total non-agricultural income (i.e., wage 
and property income) on the G of 
y 
a) all households is somewhat unfavorable before the turning point and 
favorable after the turning point (Curves I and IV) 
b) urban households is neutral before the turning point and 
favorable after the turning point 
( Curves. II and V) 
c) rural households is neutral before the turning point and 
unfavorable after the turning point 
(Curves III and VI). 
Returning to agricultural income: 
F.22: The GA curves of Diagrams 2 and 4 (Panel A) permit the conclusion 
that the factor Gini effect of agricultural income is, on the whole, 
favorable to the Gini of both the farm and total family models. 
This results from the fact that lower income agricultural families 
are seen to be consistently improving their position relative to higher 
income agricultural families. 
½he explanation for the U-shaped pattern for rural industries is less 
obvious. 
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We are now in a position to supplement the above "qualitative analysis" 
with a more precise "quantitative analysis." The actual annual average 
changes of Gy (i.e., dGy /dt), before. and after the turning point, for the 
three models, are indicated in column (1) of Table 2. 1 Notice that in the 
All Households model, G increases moderately before the turning pointy . 
while declining significantly after the turning point. This contrast of a 
"moderate change" with a "significant change," visually apparent from 
Diagram 2 (Panel A), can now be seen precisely in terms of the fact that 
the absolute magnitude of decline after the turning point (-.0146) is 
nearly 10 times as large as the moderate annual increase before the turning 
point (.0013). Similarly, for the Rural Households model, the c.ontrast between 
a significant decline (-.0168) before, with a moderate decline (-.0014) after 
the turning point should be noted. In the Non-Farm Households model, the 
contrast between a moderate increase (.0020) before the turning point with a 
substantial decline (-.0167) after the turning point should also be noted. 
In the case of a significant change of the G for any of the threey 
models, in either direction, we want to determine the quantitatively dominant 
causative factors. On the other hand, in the case of moderate or no changes in 
G,
y we want to determine whether this is due to the stability of all the causa­
tive factors or, alternatively, to the cancellation of "positive" causative 
factors with "negative" causative factors. 
1The numbers in brackets in each cell of column (1) represent observed
annual average changes of G, while the numbers without brackets represent
the sum of the estimated chXnges of the components (i.e., ·A' + A" + B)
according to equation (3.10). The small differences between the estimated
and exact changes is due to three sources, the first two of which have been
referred to earlier: (i) the existence of a small non-linearity error;
(ii) the fact that the distributive shares do not exactly add up to one,
since some "mixed income" components were excluded; and (iii) the need to
make discrete approximations to continuous changes. 
Table 2 
Decomposition of the Changes in FID 
Decomposition of(Net)Factor Gini Effect 
Agriculture and Property Income 
Functional Non-Agriculture and Wage Income
Average Annual (Net) Factor Reallocation Distribution Non-Agri- Agri-
Change of G Gini Effect Effect Effecty culture culture Property Wage 
(1) (2) (3) ( 4) (5) (6) ( 7) ( 8) 
Before +.0013 = +.0012 +.00002 -.00001 . 0077 -.0065 .0006 .0071 
1968 [.0016] (92%) (15%)
C/) 
(-8%) (592%) (-500%) (8%) (92%) 
q 
...:t 




0 After -.0146 = -.0131 -.0010 -.0025 -.0108 -.0023 -.0042 -.0066::r:: 
...:t 
...:t 1968 [-.0131] (-90%) (7%) (-17%) (-74%) (-16%)<:t: (39%) ( 61%) 
(2) (F4) (F7) (Fl2) (F2la) (F22) (F20c) (F20c) 
Before -.0168 = -.0083 -.0068 -.0017 -.0036 -.0047 -.0021 -.0015 
C/) 
q 
...:t 1968 [-.0181] (-49%) (-40%) (-11%) (-21%) (-28%) (-58%) (-42%)0 
::r:: 
µ-=I ( 3) (rs)C/) ( F9) (Fl2) (F2lc) (F22) (F20b) ( F20b)::::> 
0 
::r:: 
After -.0014 = +.0009 -.0019 -.0004 .0053 -.0044 +.0012 .0041 
~ 
<:t: 1968 [ - 0 J (+64%) (-136%) (-29%) (379%) (-314%) (23%) ( 77%)r.,.., 
(4) (rs) (F9) (Fl2) ( F2lc) (F22) (F20b) ( F20b) 
C/) Before +.0020q = -.0003 +.0023 -.0003 +.005 -.0008...:t 
0 
::r:: 1968 [.0036] (-15%) 
.. 
µ-=I (115%) (-15%) ( 16 7%) (-267%)
C/) 
::::> 
0 (5) (F5)::r:: (Fl2) (F2lb) (F20a) (F20a) 
~ 
<:t: 
r.,.., After -.0167 -.0132 -.0035 -.0132 -.0051 -.0080 
:z; 
I 1968 [-.0166] (-79%) (-21%) (-79%) (39%) (61%) 
:z; 
0 (6) (FS) (Fl2) ( F2lb) (F20a) (F20a)l-~·~-·-- . -
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Concentrating first on the All Households model, our major quantitative 
finding is that 
(l) For the All Households model, the dominant causative factor of 
change is the Factor Gini Effect. More precisely: 
(a) Before the turning point, the modest gain in G is due to they 
dominance of the unfavorable contribution of the non-agricultural 
Gini effect over the favorable agricultural Gini effect. 
(b) After the turning point, the significant decline of G------------'"'---'"----'------'""----------- y--
is 
contributed to by the favorable contribution• of both the 
agricultural and non-agricultural Gini effects, especially 
the former. 
From Table 2, Column (2),(Rows land 2), we see that for both before 
and after the turning point, the factor Gini effect accounts for over 90% 
of the total causation of change of G . The reallocation effect is 15%y 
before and 7% after the turning point, i.e., losing importance; the func-
tional distribution effect (8% before and l7% after) is gaining weight. 
Together they account for only 8-l0% of the total change of G , in eithery 
direction. Thus, for the All Households model, the factor Gini effect 
clearly dominates and warrants more careful examination. It should be 
noted that we have labeled Column (2) of Table 2 the (Net) Factor Gini 
Effect. This is because the factor Gini effect can be decomposed further, by 
applying equation (3.lO). The results are shown in columns (5) to (8) of 
Table 2. In columns (5) and (6), the decomposition is performed with respect 
. . . l h .to agricultural and non-agricultural income. .Te non-agricultural income 
l 
In other words, the values in columns (5) and (6) add up to the valuein column (6). Likewise, the percentagEs, in ( 5) and ( 6), add up to thoseof column (2). 
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Gini effect of column (5) can be further decomposed into its wage and property 
lGini effects as shown in columns (7) and (8). 
There is a basic difference between the factor Gini effect before and 
after the turning point. Before the turning point, the factor Gini effect 
for the two production sectors (agricultural [-500%] and non-agricultural 
[-592%]) work in opposite directions (see columns (5) and (6), Table 2). 
After the turning point, they work in the same favorable direction with 
non-agriculture making the larg~contribution. This means that the indus­
trial factor Gini coefficient, G, (in equation (3.10)) itself has a veryX 
pronounced inverted U-shaped characteristic, 2 reminding us of the Kuznets 
hypothesis. However, the existence of a continuously falling agricultural 
Gini, GA' somewhat overcomes the inverse-U-shaped characteristic of Gx-­
producing the observable pattern of G.
y 
The implications of this conclusion for distribution and growth in the 
labor surplus economy are three-fold, First, the "Kuznets effect" is not very 
pronounced, i.e. , the "conflict" between development and FID before the turning 
point is relatively mild. Second, the "switch" from a slightly worsening to 
an improving FID after the turning point may be said to be largely due to a 
significant shift in the contribution of the non-agricultural Gini effect (from 
+592% to -74%). In other words, before the turning point, it is the non-agricultural 
sector which is almost entirely responsible for the (slight) worsening of the 
overall Gini, since rapid industrialization apparently requires an increasingly 
heterogeneous labor force and a differentiated industrial structure, with 
l The values of (7) and (8) add up to the value in column (5). (But
the two percentages in (7) and (8) add up to 100%.) 
2
This can be easily shown when the time series G is plotted.
X 
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wealthier families owning the large scale and poorer families the smaller 
scale. l Third, we see that, from the very beginning, the agricultural Gini 
effect is powerful and favorable and thus represents an important 
instrument for reducing the initial (upward) steepness of the inverted U-shaped 
pattern,and possibly eliminating it altogether. 
(2) For the farm households, the favorable reallocation effect has a 
quantitative significance which is equal to or greater than that 
of the factor Gini effect. 
(a) Before the turning point, the significant decline of G----------=---=-----'-----....cc..-----------y 
was con~ributed to by a favorable factor Gini effect 
and a favorable reallocation effect of approximately the 
same weight. 
(b) After the turning point, the moderate decline of Gy is due 
to the fact that the unfavorable factor Gini effect is over-
whelmed by a favorable reallocation effect. 
Thus, before the turning point, both the factor Gini effect (-49%) and 
the reallocation effect (-40%) are favorable and quantitatively important. 
The functional distribution effect accounts for only ll% of the total change 
of the Gini. After the turning point, the favorable reallocation effect (-l36%) 
is nearly twice as large and thus overwhelms the unfavorable factor Gini effect 
(+64%). As compared with the All Households model, we see that the realloca-
tion effect is a much more important factor here in explaining the consistent 
improvement in the equity of FID for rural households. This is due to the 
~otice that the wage income Gini effect ( column ( 8)) contributes the lion's 
share (92%) during the pre-turning point (unfavorable) phase but gradually
gives way to the property income Gini effect in the post-turning point
(favorable) phase. This is undoubtedly related to the reduction of market 
imperfections favoring the largercapitalistsand the unionized workers after l968. 
-47-
obvious fact that, for rural households, agriculture provides a. dominant 
source of income. If we recall that GA exceeds Gx (the Gini of income from 
rural industries), we can readily see why the relative decline of the weight 
of agricultural income over time aLd the relative gain in the weight of non­
agricultural income (favoring the relatively poorer families) represents a 
dominant factor in the improvement of rural household FID. 
Notice that the decomposed factor Gini effects behave differently 
before and after the turning point. While the agricultural factor Gini 
effect is consistently favorable (i.e., -28% before and -314% after the 
turning point), the non-agricultural Gini effect changes from making a 
mildly favorable (-21%) to a strongly unfavorable (379%) impact after the 
·turning point. The non-agricultural factor Gini effect (i.e., income from 
rural industries) thus has a distinct U-shaped characteristic while the 
agricultural income factor Gini effect has a consistent impact on improving 
the overall FID of rural households. 
The practical policy significance of our findings is that, before the 
turning point, ~ural industries grow in a context of abundant supplies of 
surplus labor while, after the turning point, the environment becomes much 
more commercialized, with labor becoming a scarce and more expensive factor. 
Thus, before the turning point we expect rural industries to benefit the 
relatively low income families in the mopping up of unemployed rural labor. 
After the turning point, on the other hand, the changed environment leads us 
to expect the income distribution generated by rural industries to begin to 
contribute to an unfavorable factor Gini effect as labor becomes more hetero­
geneous and rural industry more differentiated by scale. Our analysis has 
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shown that this unfavorable development can be offset by two favorable 
trends (i.e., the allocation effect and the agricultural income Gini effect) 
leading to a possible overall improvement in FID equity. The new rural 
industries and services can thus produce a slight overall improvement through-
out in the FID for rural families, even though in this process forces are 
generated (e.g. , the factor Gini effect associated 
with the creation of relatively modern rural industries) which work against 
improving FID. 
(3) For non-farm households~ the functional distribution effect 
represents a quantitatively significant causative factor in 
determining changes in overall FID. 
(a) Before the turning point, the modest rise in G is due---------~~--~-----------y 
to the fact that an unfavorable functional distribution 
effect overwhelmed the favorable factor Gini effect. 
(b) After the turning point,-----------""--''----'-----=-----------
the significant decline of G 
y 
is mainly contributed to by a favorable factor Gini effect 
which is reinforced by a favorable functional distribution 
effect. 
Thus, before the turning point, the unfavorable functional distribution 
effect (115%) is almost eight times as large as the favorable factor Gini 
effect (-15%) and hence overwhelms it. After the turning point, the 
decline of G is accounted for 1ointly by the favorable factor Gini effecty 
(-80%) and a favorable functional distribution effect(-20%). · Notice that, 
in contrast with the two early models, nowwe cannot neglect the functional 
distribution effect on overall FID--for the obvious reason that it is in 
the relatively large scale urban industries that capital deepening and 
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technology change are prominent features of industrialization. In particular, 
our earlier conclusion pointed to the fact that while high innovation inten­
sity contributes unfavorably to the FID of urban families before the turning 
point, capital deepening induced by real wage increases plus the force of 
innovations made a favorable contribution to FID after the turning point. 
Notice that while the factor Gini effect had a consistent favorable 
impact over the whole period, its negative contribution after the turning 
point (-.0132 per year) is more than 40 times as large as before the turning 
point (-.0003 per year). It is thus clear that the coming of the turning 
point signals a substantial improvement in the contribution of both wage 
(-.0091) and property (-.0080) income in the urban centers--as the strength 
'of dualism within urban industry is reduced. The overall pattern of non-farm 
family FID thus fits the Kuznets pattern quite well--as in the All Families 
case. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we have attempted to analyze the distribution of family 
income at the aggregate level, and have shown that FID, as measured by G ,y 
is much affected by the particular forces of growth that the country is 
experiencing. In the case of Taiwan, for exainple, the arrival ·of the turning 
point (signifying the exhaustion of surplus labor) can bring about a. marked 
difference in the behavior of G. In analyzing the causation of the changey 
of G 
y 
and relating it to growth, it is crucial to give prominent recognition 
to the fact that family income has several factor components, differing in 
type and impact,on overall equity (in our empirical case, agriculture, wage 
and property incomes). The change of G through time, as affected by growth,y 
can then be analyzed in terms of reallocation effects, factor Gini effects, 
and functional distribution effects, defined in terms of these factor com­
ponents, in quantitative as well as qualitative terms. 
Along with the importance given to historical phases in growth theory 
goes the recognition of the relevance of sectoral dualism. Such dualism 
is a root cause of some of the complexities inherent in FID analysis because 
the incomesgenerated by different production sectors tend to behave dif­
ferently in their respective impact on G. The relevance of this structure y 
is reflected in the identification of the three separate models---all house-
holds, farm households, and non-farm households--according to which our theo­
retical as well as empirical analysis of the Taiwan case was organized. 
A number of our findings with basic implications for both policy and 
the future strategy of research deserve a succinct summary. With respect 
to the implications for policy, our findings tend to support the notion 
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that the most effective method of tackling the maldistribution of income 
is via a change in the nature of the growth path itself. Income distribu-
tion can, of course, be affected directly, e.g., via fiscal policy and trans­
fers (e.g., Type Three incomes);
1
but the experience of Taiwan--with unusually 
low levels of Gini and an unusually mild Kuznets effect over time, and 
without any significant Type Three income--bears out our conviction that 
significant and sustained changes in FID equity achieved mainly through theare 
modification of the forces underlying the pattern of growth. 
Our first conclusion relates to the possibilities demonstrated here 
for a substantial'reduction (and possibly elimination) of the so-called 
conflict between growth and income distribution. Our work clearly demon­
strates how and why the arrival of the turning point and the exhaustion 
of labor surplus benefit the overall distribution of income along with the 
objective of growth. But even more interesting is the finding that, even 
before the turning point, the agricultural income Gini can make a substantial 
contribution to the moderation of any worsening of the distribution of income. 
The non-farm household distribution pattern follows the ovErall pattern 
most closely (i.e., it is also inverse U-shaped) but it is substantially 
more pronounced thanks to the ameliorating effect of the farm household patterns. 
Turning to these farm households, we may note that the initially favorable 
pattern of the distribution of income before the turning point derives essen­
tially from two sources: one is the unusually dispersed location pattern 
of Taiwanese industries providing employment and profit opportunities to the 
relatively poor rural families. (This is reflected in the reallocation 
effect showing the shift of the poorest members of the rural population into 
small-scale labor-intensive rural industry as indexed by a decline of the 
1But keep in mind the very limited fiscal capacity of most LDC 
governments. 
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agricultural share and an increase of the non-agricultural share of rural 
family incomesf The second beneficial contribution is made by the fact 
that agricultural income itself (i.e., the agricultural Gini effect) shows 
a pattern of consistent and sustained distributional equity, i.e., a low GA 
both before and after the turning point. It is this effect more than any 
other that improves the overall equity of farm families and softens the 
Kuznets tendency toward a worsening of the FID for all families before the
\ 
turning point. Rapid agricultural mobilization based on the improvement 
of the efficiency of relatively poor,small farmers, both as farmers and as 
participants in the rapidly growing rural industries and services,thus 
played a decisive role. 
Our analysis, and its inadequacies, also point out directions future 
research might usefully take. What we have tried to do, essentially, is to 
decompose the overall pattern of income distribution by type of income, and, 
via a time-phased examination of changes in different growth regimes, to tie 
the analysis of FID to the analysis of the underlying factors determining 
growth. The decomposition of total FID change into its component effects 
also gives us an indication as to where future effort might have the largest 
explanatory pay-off for each of the models under consideration. For example, 
when the factor Gini effect accounts for 80% of the total explanation of 
overall FID changes, it clearly pays to expend more research effort on the 
behavior underlying it; similarly, the functional distribution effect warrants 
more attention in some cases than in others. 
Secondly, we can already see the need to further integrate two types of 
analytical procedures: ours, which decomposes family income by additive 
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factor income components, and Theil's which segments family income by homo-
1geneous groups. Our division of total households into farm and non-farm 
goes some distance in this direction but does not permit as clear-cut a division 
. . d . . . 2into inter- an intra-sectoral ine~uity. Theil's segmentation as employed 
by Fishlow, 3 on the other hand, does not lend itself to a search for real 
causation via linkage to growth-relevant phenomena. The attempt to marry 
these two procedures should prove useful and productive. 
Thirdly, we may note that, of the three effects isolated in our paper, 
the reallocation effect (related to the relative weight of the agricultural 
sector) and the functional distribution effect (related to the change in dis­
tributive shares) can be linked with certain familiar notions in growth theory. 
· On the other hand, we do not as yet have the level of formal theorysame 
for tackling an explanation of the powerful factor Gini effect. We know that 
the wage Gini and property Gini effects, for example, must be tackled at more 
of a micro level. The wage Gini effect through time is evidently related to 
the changing heterogeneity of labor as differentiated by age, sex, educa­
tional attainment, etc., which is, in turn,related to private and public de­
cisions on education for different income levels in the course of growth. 
Similarly, the property Gini effect is related to the changing structure of 
the family ownership of capital stock in terms of size, location and monopoly 
power which is, in turn, related to gradual changes in differential saving 
l 
Henry Theil, Economics and Information Theory, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1967. 
2
We can and do deal with the subject on a more intuitive level (see our 
discussion relating to the consistency and convergence phenomena pictured in Dia­
gram 6 above) • 
3
see A. Fishlow, "Brazilian Size Distribution of Income, 11 -~ER, May 1972. 
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behavior, and the more radical effects of inheritance and tax laws. The 
agricultural factor Gini effect, in much the same way, can be seen to relate 
to the changing family ownership of land and heterogeneous labor, which can 
be modified over time by such gradual changes as saving and educational 
investments and such radical changes as land reform. Our analysis of FID can thus 
provide us, at this stage, with a framework for determining where the 
major problems are and where future efforts must be made if we are to achieve 
a fully deterministic theory of the functional distribution of income and 
be in a position to deploy those elements of policy which reduce or eliminate 
the conflict between FID and growth. 
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Appendix 
The abstract framework for the quantitative analysis utilized in the 
paper will be rigorously deduced in this Appendix and illustrated with the 
help of a nwnerical example to guide our discussion. In the example we 
shall asswne there are n=5 families with r=3 factor income components: 
wage income, property income, and transfer income. 
Table Al 








































Total Income 11 13 19 23 34 100 
Table Al contains all the primary data needed for our analysis. Notice 
that property income (transfer income) is concentrated heavily among the 
wealthy families (poor families). The total family income indicated at the 
bottom of Table Al is arranged in a monotonically non-decreasing: order (i.e.,· 
Y1 .2_ Y2 .2_ ••• .2_ Y5). (The rank index of each factor income component is 
indicated in parentheses.) Thus there exists an assumed perfect positive 
(negative) rank correlation between total family income (Y.) and property
l 
(transfer) income--describing the difference in characteristics of these 
two types of incomes which will be essential to our analysis. 
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To help our discussion, all the computation results based on Table Al 
are shown in Table A2. The last column, (4), of this table 
always indicates the sum of all entries in the first three columns. For 
example, the three distributive shares are indicated in row (l); their sum 
is l, as shown in column (4). 
Gini Coefficient, Pseudo Gini Coefficient and Gini Error 
We begin with a rigorous definition of a Gini coefficient, G, (andy 
analogously, a Pseudo Gini coefficient, G, which can be defined for anyy 
non-negative vector, Y 
Al) a) y = (Yl, Y2, ... , y ) > 0 n 
b) s = yl + y2 + + y > 0 y n 
c) y. = Y./S i = 1, 2, ... , n 
l l y 
+ y = 1 n 
Notice that y. (i=l, ... ,n) are fractions of total income which add up to 1 
l 
in (Ald). Since the elements in Y may or may not satisfy the following 
"monotonic" condition 
A2) 0 < y < y < < y 
- 1 - 2 - - n 




, ... , in) of the first "n" integers (1, 2, ... ,n) 
such that the monotonic condition 
A3) < y. 
- l n 
is satisfied. The Lorenz curve is a real valued function defined on 









































































































































































5 (15) 14.000 22.500 -2.500 Y5 = 34 





Estimated F+ = 
0.1777 
0.0800 F+ = 
0.7083 
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G = .4319 
Ay 
E = G - G = .2080 
y y 
+ -~ = H - H y 
(.2800 = .4080 - .1280) 
e = -[e+ - 0-J 
.0561 = -[-.0801-(-.0240)] 
s 
G = G - e y y 
(.2239 = .2800 - .0561) 
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A4) (j=l,2,-.,n) 







4) = (.2, .4, .1, .3) then (i1 , i 2 , i 3 , i 4 ) = (3,1,4,2 
and the Lorenz curve is shown in diagram Al(a). Let the area under the Lorenz 
curve of the unit square of this diagram be denoted by B. Then the Gini 
coefficient is 
AS) Gy = c; -B)/(1/2) = l - 2B 
· and we have the following theorem: 
Theorem Al The Gini Coefficient of Y (Ala) is 
A6) a) G = au ...: 13, wherey y 
b) a = 2/n; 13 = (n + 1)/n, and 
c) uy = >--1Y· + A2Y· + ... + A y. , wherell l2 n l n
d) Al = 1, A.2 = 2, ... , An = n 
Proof: The area above the Lorenz Curve is 
= (y. + y. + . . . + y. )In + (y. + y. + . . . + y. )/n + ... + y. /n -ll l2 l l2 l3 l ln n n 
(y. + y. + . . . y . )/2n
ll l2 l n 
= (ly. + 2y. + + ny. )/n - l/2n by (Ald)
ll l2 l n 
lG
y = l - 2B = l + 2 [ 
n
I >-..y. )/n - -- l] Q.E.D.. l l l. 2ni= J 
The theorem states that the Gini coefficient, G,y is a linear transformation 
of the "u-index" of Y defined in (A6c). 
When Y (Ala) is given, we may also define a Pseudo-Lorenz Curve which 
is similar to the formal definition of a Lorenz Curve except that the income 
fractions y.
l 
in (Ale) are not arranged in a monotonically non-decreasing 
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y d 





















order. Thus, formally, the Pseudo-Lorenz Curve is defined as: 
A7) j = 1, 2, ... , n 
For the same raw data of Diagram ~la), the Pseudo-Lorenz Curve is indicated 
by the dotted curve a'b'c'd' of Diagram (Alb). 
When we denote the area under the Pseudo-Lorenz Curve as B, a Pseudo-
Gini Coefficient can also be defined in a way similar to (AS), namely: 
Aa) G y = l 2B 
We can then deduce: 
Theorem A2, i.e., the Pseudo-Gini Coefficient of Y (Ala) is 
-A9) a) G = au - S, where y y 
and where a, Sand A. are defined in (A6).
l 
The Gini error of Yin (Ala) can be defined in terms of G and G y y 
AlO) E = G G y y 
In other words, the Gini error E is the difference between the Gini 
and the Pseudo-Gini coefficient of Y. We then have the following theorem: 
Theorem A3 For any non-negative vector Y (Ala), the Gini error is non-
negative. The Gini error is zero if the monotonic condition 
(A2) is satisfied. 
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Proof: From (Al0}, (A9) and (A6), we have 
E = G G = ( au - S) (au - S) = (2/n)V wherey y y y 
V = uy - u = [>-.1 ,y. + A.2Y· + . . . + >-. y. J - [>-.lyl + >-.2y2 + ... + >-.nyn Jy ll l2 n l n 
It is sufficient to investigate the sign of V. We can use the numerical 
example of Diagram (Al) to illustrate the logic of the proof. In this example: 
V = [l (.1) + 2 (.2) + 3 (.3) + 4 (.4)] - [l (.2) + 2 (.4) + 3 (.1) + 4 (.3)] 
There is a finite number of steps through which (y
1 , y2 , y3 , y4 ) can be 
rearranged into a monotonically increasing order: 
( y l , y 2,y 3, y 4 ) = ( • 2 , • 4, . 1, . 3 ) Jl = 1(.2)+2(.4)+3(.1)+4(.3) = 2.5
Step One: 




,y4 ,y2 )=(. 2, .1,. 3,. 4) J3 = 1( .2)+2( .1)+3(. 3)+4( .4) = 2.91Step Three: 
(y3,Y1,Y4,Y2)=(.l,.2,.3,.4) J4 = 1(.1)+2(.2)+3(.3)+4(.4) = 3.0 
In each step a larger y.
l 
is moved to the right by an adjacent interchange. 
The largest y. (in our case y
l 2 
= .4) is first moved to its proper place. 
Then the. next largest yi (in our case y
4 
= .3) is moved to its proper place, etc. 
Thus J
1 , J 2 , J 3 and J 4 increase monotonically to J 4 = uy. Hence 
V = u -J = .5 u -J = .2 u -J = .1, u -J4=o monotonically decreases to zero.yl 'y2 'y3 y 
Thus V must be non-negative. Q.E.D. 
A geometric interpretation of the Gini error is seen from the fact that 
All) E = (1 - 2B) - (1 - 2B) .•• by (A5) and (AB) 
= 2(B - B) 
and hence the area between the Pseudo-Lorenz Curve and the Lorenz Curve is 
one-half the value of the Gini error (see Diagram (Alb)). 
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If Y of (Ala) satisfies the following 11 reverse 11 monotonic order: 
(Al2) > y > 0 = n 
Then we have the following theorem: 
Theorem A4: If Y = (Y ~ , ... , Yn) satisfies the conditions of reverse
1 2 
monotonic order (Al2), then 
E = 2 G or G = G 
y y y y 
i . e. , the Pseudo-Gini lS the negative of the true Gini. 
Proof: The proof can be seen from Diagram (Ale) in which the dotted curve 
a 11 b 11 c"J" is L11e Pseudo-Lorenz Curve for (y = .4, y = .3, y = .2, Y = .1)
1 2 3 4 
which Sdtisfies the reverse monotonic order. Because the Pseudo-Lorenz Curve 
and the Lorenz Curve abed are "symmetrical" with respect to the 45 degree 
line, the area between them is twice A, the area between the 45 degree line 
and the Lorenz Curve. Thus, by (All), 
E = 2(2A) = 2 • A/.5 = 2A(B+A) = 2G 
y y 
The fact G = G follows directly from (AlO). Q.E.D.y y 
Total Income and Factor Components 
Suppose the total income pattern Y (Ala) is the vector sum of r-factor 
components: 
Al3) a) y = Wl + w2 + + wr 
b) wi = (Wl, 
i 
W2, 
l ... ' Wi) > 0 , i=l,2, ... ,r-n 
c) cp. = Si/S where
l y 
Si wi + wi + + wid) = i = 1, 2, ... , r
l 2 n 
e) s 
y 
= yl + y2 + ... + y n 




(i=l,2, •.. ,r) of (Al3f) are the distributive shares. 
We then have the following Lennna: 
Lennna Al. The fraction of the total income of the jth family is the weighted 
average of the factor shares: 
Al4) 
Proof: y. = (S1/S )(W~)/S1 + (S2/S )(W~)/S2 + + (Sr/S )(W~)/SJ y J y J y J y
1 2= (W. + W. + + W.)/S
J J J y 
= Y./S Q.E.D.J y 
Let us assume that the ordering of the families has been arranged so that 
the total income patterns Y of (Al3a) satisfies the monotonically non-decreasing 
condition (A2). Under this convention the factor income pattern of (Al3b) may 
or may not satisfy the monotonic condition. Hence we can define a factor 
Pseudo-Gini coefficient for each factor, G., in the same way as in Theorem A2
1. 
for total Gini, and prove the following theorem: 
Theorem AS: The Gini coefficient of total family income (G)
y 
is the weighted 
sum of the factor Pseudo Gini coefficients when the distributive 
shares~- are the weights:----1. 
Proof: By (A6), the u-index of Y is 
u = A1y. + A2y. + ... +A y. (i1 = 1, i 2 = 2, iy 1 1 1.2 n l n n = n) 
1 l= A1[~1 (W/S ) + ~2(W~/S2) + + ~/W~/Sr)] by Lemma (Al) 
1 1











is the pseudo u-index of the ith factor component (A9b). 
Thus the Gini coefficient of Y, by (A6a) is: 
Gy = ( 2/n)uy - (n+l)/n 
= (2/n)[cp1u1 + <P2u2 + ... +<Pu] - (n+l)/nr r 
= <Pi( 2/n)u1 (n+l)/n] + <Pi(2/n)u2 -
(n+l) J + .. , + <P [(2/n)u - n+l]n r r n 
Q.E.D. 
For each factor income component (Al3b) we can also define a factor Gini 
coefficient, G., and a factor Gini error, E.:l l 
Al6) E. = G. G. > 0
l l l = (i = 1, 2, •.. , r) ... by (AlO) 
which are non-negative, by Theorem (A3). Substituting G. of (Al6) into (Al5), 
we have 
l 
From this result we immediately have the following theorem: 
Theorem A6: The Gini-coefficient of total income G (Al3a) is the difference------------------y'-------------
between an approximate Gini G"
y 
and a weighted Gini-error term, E: 
Al8) a) G
y = G"y E where 
b) G
A 
y = cplGl + <P2G2 + ... + <P G 





where Eis non-negative. 
Proof: by (Al7) and (Al6). 
-All-
/\ 
The term G 
y 
in (Al8c) is the weighted sum of the factor Gini coefficients 
and E (Al8c) is the weighted sum of the factor Gini errors. Notice that 
A
when the errors are small, when Eis negligible, G 
y 
can be taken as an approxi­
mation of G. 
y 
When this is the case, we can use this approximation and say 
that a factor income contributes to inequality of total family income distribu-
tion when the factor itself is very unequally distributed,. i.e. , G. is large,------------------~--~--~-----------l-----
and/or when a fu:!Dr' s distributive share is large, i.e. , ¢ . is .large. Such an. l 
approximation tends to slightly overestimate the true G. However, when the y 
Gini errors large, i.e., when Eis not negligible, the overestimation of theare 
true Gini is too large and the approximation cannot be taken for· granted. In 
the following sections, we shall analyze the forces that determine the magni­
tude of the Gini error. 
Returning to our example, in Table (A2), the factor Gini coefficients are 
Aindicated in row (2). The weighted overall Gini coefficient, G, is shown 
y 
in row (3), column (4), showing a value of .5360. The Pseudo-Ginis for each 
factor income are indicated in row (4) and the computation of the true Gini, 
G, 
y 
as the weighted sum of these factor Pseudo-Ginis is shown in row (5) 
,I\
leading to G 
y 
= .2239. Thus when G 
y 
is used as an estimator of the true Gini, G, we y 
have an overestimation of the true Gini by E = 
/\ 
G - G = .3121, or more than 100%.y y 
The Gini errorsfor each factor in row (6) are the differences between rows (4) 
and (2) and the weighted Gini error term is computed in row (7) leading to 
E = .3121 which is the same value as G 
A 
- G above. y y' 
In the next sections the Gini error will be fully decomposed into two 
types of errors: the error due to the existence of Type Three income, and 
the error due to non-linearity. 
-Al2-
Linear Approximation 
Given the total income pattern, Y, and the factor components, Wi 
(Al3b), we can find a linear regression of Wion Yin the form: 
Al9) wi = b. + a.Y i = 1, 2, ... , r . 
l l 
When the parameters a. and b. are estimated by the method of least squares,
l l 
it is easy to prove: 
A20) a) b + b + + b = 01 2 r 
b) a + a + + a = l1 2 r 
From the regression lines of (Al9) we can compute the estimated factor 
income patterns for each factor component (i=l,2, ... ,r) 
satisfying: 
A • 
A21) w: = b. + a.Y. i=l,2, ... ,r; j=l,2, ... ,n 
] l l J 
We then have the following lemma: 
Lemma A2. 
"'l "2 "ra) y = (Yl' y2' ••• ' y ) = w + w + ... w n 
b) <p • - (Wi + wi + + w!)/(Y1 + y2 + + 
y )
l l 2 n 
I\. /I• 
= (Wl + Wl + + w!)/(Y1 + y2 + + 
y )
l 2 n 
Proof: The jth component of the vector on the right hand side of (a) is 
"l "2 "rw. + w. + . . . + w. = (b1 + a1Yj) + (b2 + a 2Yj) + ... (b + a y.)J J J r r J 






= Y. (by A20b)
J 
This proves Lemma A2a. The validity of A2b follows as a property of 
linear regression. Q.E.D. 
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Lemma A2a states that total income is a vector sum of the estimated 
pattern of factor incomes. Lemma A2b states that the distributive shares 
defined in (Al3c) can also be computed from the estimated pattern of 
factor income. 
Returning to Table A2, the regression coefficients b. and a. are shown
l l 
in rows (8) and (9). Notice that conditions (A20) are satisfied. Property 
income is type one; wage income.futype two; and transfer income is type 
three, as indicated in row (10). (See Section II in text.) With the aid of 
the linear regression equations the estimated factor income patterns are in­
dicated in rows (ll) - (15). Lemma A2 is satisfied as can be s,een by row (16) 
and column (4) (rows (11)-(15)) which are identical to the original income 
pattern. This "expected pattern" of factor components may be interpreted 
as a linear approximation of the original data. In this section we shall 
concern ourselves only with this system of linear approximations to reality. 
We will now trace the component parts of the Gini error term E (as 
defined in (AlO)) in two steps. First, we shall see that, if we accept 
the linear approximation, the Gini error is traced entirely to the existence 
of Type Three income and thus a "Type Three error" can be defined. 
Second, when we examine the deviation of the original data from 
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linearity, we can identify another component of the Gini error, namely 
the so-called non-linearity error. 
Type Three Error 
In this section, we shall only be concerned with the Type Three error 
using the linear approximation data. l In the next section, we shall be con-
cerned with the deviation of the original data from the linear approximation. 




where G(Wi) is the Gini coefficient of the pattern of estimated factor 
Ai I\





In other words, AE. is the difference between the Gini of the estimated 
i 
pattern and the pseudo-Gini of the estimated pattern. Since we have assumed 
that Y satisfies the monotonic conditions (A2), there are two types of cases, 
corresponding to income types land 2, on the one hand, and income type 3, 
on the other (see text). 
A24) a) Income Types One and Two: 
If ai ~ 0, the estimated pattern satisfies the monotonic 
,._ • "i A• 
condition: w1 < w2 ... < wil - n 
Hence: /'IE. = 0, G(Wi) = G(Wi) ..• by Theorem (A3)
i 
b) Income Type Three: 
If a 
i 
. .::_ 0, the estimated pattern satisfies the j~nverse mono­
l'li Ai Ai
tonic condition: w1 .:... w2 .:... •.. .:... Wn . 
Hence: ~- = 2G(~i); G(Wi) = - G(Wi) by Theorem (A4).
l 
1A . l . .simp e interpretation of the work in the rest of this section is there­
fore as follows: Suppose the linearity condition is satisfied by the original 
data; then the Gini error has no "non-linearity error" and E consists only of 
"Type Three error." 
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Thus, if the first r 2 terms of (A22) correspond to non-negative ai and the 
last r - r 
2 terms correspond to negative ai, we have the following theorem 
by (A22) and (A24): 
Theorem A7: In the linear approximation (A21), when the last r-r2 regres-
sion coefficients, a., are strictly negative:-----------l ------~-~-----
A25) a) G = F+ - F wherey 
F+ 4 1 "2 Ar2b) = ¢1G(W) + ¢2G(W) + . . . + <Pr2G(W )
/<r +l r.r2+2 Ac) F = <P 1G(W 2 ) + cp G(W ) + ..• + cp G(Wr)r2+ r 2+2 r 
Notice that the correlation coefficient between each estimated pattern 
/I •
Wl and total income is, of course, perfect, i.e., r = +l for Type One and 
Type Two incomes and r=-1 for Type Three income (since perfect linearity 
is implied by definition). Thus, when the original data wi has an almost 
perfect linear correlation with Y, the above theorem suggests that a 




in (Al8b). In other words, the correct approximation formula 
includes positive weights for Type One and Type Two income components and 
negative weights for Type Three income components. Intuitively, this is due to the 
fact that Type Three income contributes to equality rather than inequality. 
The factor Gini coefficients of these patterns are shown in row (17) 
of Table A2. The computation of the F+ and F terms of (A25) is shown in 
. . + -row (18), i.e., F = .3279 and F = .1040. The true Gini coefficient is their 
difference which is exactly equal to .2239, the G in row (5), column (4).y 
...
Thus, in the case of perfect linear approximation, the estimator G
y 
is a perfect 
estimator because no error whatsoever is committed. 
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If we were to apply the estimator, G, (as defined in (Al8) which can y 
be applied to any set of data) to the linear approximation data of Table Al, 




= .4319 and a Gini error of E = .2080. Thus when the linear approximation 
A 
holds, the use of the estimator G 
y 
eliminates Type Three error. 
Another theorem relevant to the linear approximation which we use in 
the text deals with the relationship between the overall and factor Gini. 
- Ai
Theorem A8: G(W) = (a./¢.)G
l l y 
by (A6c) 
by l + 2 + ... + n = (n+l)n/2 by (A9b) 
G = ¾(b. [n+l]/2ti + a.Y u ;ti] - (n+l)/n by (A6a)Ai n l l yw 
-i - -i= b.(n+l)/nW + (a. Y/W )[2u /n (n+l)/n]
l l y 
+ (a.Y/W~h+l/n) - n+l/n
l 
- -i= n+l/n ~.+a.Yfwi - l] + (a.Y/W) G by (A6a)
l l l y 
-i -= n+l/n [(b.+a.Y}~.+a.Y) l] + a. (W /Y) G
l l l l l y 
= (a./¢. )G by (1. 2c)l l y 
Q.E.D. 
Substituting (A24) in the above we have the following: 
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A27) a) Type One and Two: G(Wi) = a.N. G 
l l y
.,..i . 
b) Type Three: G(W )= (-a. N. )G
l l y 
which is (2.1) in the text. 
Non-linearity error 
In the more normal case when the correlation coefficient between Wiand Y 










) of (A28) into (A25) we obtain the following theorem: 
~ Theorem A9: The Gini coefficient, G, can be estimated by the estimator Gy y 
A 






b) G y = H+ - H- and 
H+ = <j>lGl + <j>2G2 + + </> G (a . .2'.__ 0)
r2 r2 l -
H = <P G + <P G + .•. + <P G (a. < 0)r +1 r +1 r +2 r +2 r r l = 2 2 2 2 
= - [e+ - e-J 
= <P1G1 81 + <P2G2 82 + 
e = <P G 0 + + <P G 0r
2+1 r 2+1 r +1 r r r ~ 2 
When G 
y 
is used as an estimator of G 
y 
, the error term, " e, may bEi referred to 
as the non-linearity error. Since the estimator G of (Al8) can be written y 
as H+ + H, comparing (Al8) and (A29), we have 
,.. 
A30) a) e = E 2H or 
A 
b) E = 0 + 2H 
which shows the relation between the Gini error, E, and the non--linearity error 8. 
I\ 
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We see from (A30b) that the non-negative Gini error E has two components.: 
the linearity error 
.I\ e and the Type Three error 2H-. Notice that the 
type three error term is non-negative, i.e., 
A31) 2H ~ 0 





(because the Gini error Eis non-negative) is due 
(at least partly) to the fact that there is at least one non-negative component 
when there is type three income. 
" ~The comparative merits of the two estimators Gyand Gycan be seen from 
two extreme cases. First, suppose there is no type three income (i.e., 
A :::: A2H = 0). Then the two estimators are the same, G =G (i.e., e = E in (A30)). 1 y y 
Hence the two estimators have the same merit. Next, suppose there is Type Three 
,._ A 




is a perfect estimator and E = 2H from (A30). This means that the Gini 
error E consists only of type three error and 
A 
G is thus definitely inferior y 
~ 
to Gas an estimator. y 
" (A30) indicates that if e is a non-negative number, it is always 
A 




G,y the degree of overestimation is smaller than the overestimation by G. y 
In row (20) of Table A2, we show the estimated value of G using
y 
~ i "estimator G of (A29b). The result is G = .2800 and smaller than G = • 4319. y y y 
To compute the non-linearity error 0 of (A29c) we first calculate e. of (A28)
l 
as shown in row (21). Then we obtain e+ and e - as shown in row (22), leading 
~ " to a value of 0 = .0561. Thus the difference G e = .2soo - .o56l = .2239 y 
which is the value of the true Gini, illustrating (A29a). 
½his leads to (2.8) in the text, i.e., 6
/It 
~ 0 when there is no Type
Three income. 
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Thus,in our example, the total Gini Error E = .3121 (row (7)) can be 
decomposed into its non-linearity and Type Three error componen~s, according 
to (A30b). This yields E (.3121) = 8 (.0561) + 2H (.2560) indicating that, 
in our example, 80% of the Gini Error is accounted for by the presence of 





On the other hand, G y as the estimator results in a 
non--linearity error 
of only .0561 and thus the degree of overestimation is substantially reduced. 
